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ABSTRACT
TO REGULATE COSTS OR ACCESS? TWO APPROACHES TO HEALTH CARE
REGIONALIZATION
Lindsey J. Patterson
Guy David
The first chapter examines the effect of Marylands Global Budget Revenue (GBR) pay-
ment system on hospital volume. Under this payment system, the rate regulating authority
prospectively determines each hospital’s revenue budget based on historic utilization to slow
total hospital spending growth in the state. Theory suggests that hospitals will meet this
target by reducing volume only when they have exhausted their ability to adjust reimburse-
ment rates. Due to Marylands unique history of hospital payment, estimation of causal
effects has been limited by availability of suitable comparison groups. This paper develops
three measures of in state hospital-level exposure—hospitals with above median growth in
predicted disease burden, hospitals with above median predicted growth in hospital inpa-
tient service lines, and hospitals without revenue exclusions. For the two exposure measures
based on growth, I apply a trend-break difference-in-difference under the a priori assump-
tion that hospital volume would continue along pre-intervention trends in the absence of the
payment system change. I find no evidence that the GBR is associated with any divergence
of hospital inpatient volume from pre-intervention trends. The second chapter studies the
effect of regional systems of care on health care delivery and outcomes for time critical
illnesses of acute stroke and ST-elevation myocardial infarction (STEMI) in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. Regionalization in Philadelphia trades off small increases in patient trans-
portation time for improved access to appropriate treatment at the receiving hospital. This
paper leverages the differential impact of regionalization on neighborhoods where the near-
est hospital is not designated as a regional center of care. In these treated areas, emergency
medical services (EMS) personnel bypass the nearest hospital to transport acute stroke and
v
STEMI patients to the nearest regional center of care. Using a difference-in-differences
empirical approach, this paper estimates the effect of regionalization on the probability of
admission to a non-designated facility and a number of short-term utilization and outcome
measures. Regionalization is effective in channeling volume to designated facilities, but the
effects of regionalization are both condition and market specific.
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PREFACE
This dissertation examines two approaches to changing health care delivery in local health
care markets. While the policy examined in my first paper focuses on access and quality, the
policies examined in the second paper focus on costs and access. Together these papers touch
on all three corners of the Iron Triangle of health care—cost, quality, and access. In my first
paper, I look at Maryland’s 2014 implementation of an annual total hospital revenue cap, the
Global Budget Revenue (GBR) system—an explicit constraint on hospital spending in the
state of Maryland. Under the GBR system, Maryland’s hospital rate-regulating authority
prospectively determines each hospital’s revenue budget based on historic utilization to
slow total hospital spending growth in the state. My conceptual framework suggests that
hospitals will meet this target by reducing volume only when they have exhausted their
ability to adjust reimbursement rates (as allowed by the rate regulator). I develop three
potential measures of within-Maryland exposure to the payment system change, but find
that volume in hospitals predicted to be more exposed trended differently than volume in
hospitals predicted to be less exposed prior to the payment system change. While current
and former policy makers are confident that the GBR has changed the trajectory of hospital
care in Maryland, findings to date have been mixed as defining a suitable comparison group
is difficult (Sharfstein et al., 2018a; Roberts et al., 2018c; Sharfstein et al., 2018b).
My second paper, joint research with Guy David, looks at health care regionalization in
Philadelphia, and specifically two destination policies for time critical emergencies. The
destination policies require emergency medical services (EMS) providers to transport acute
stroke patients to hospitals certified as primary stroke centers and ST elevation myocardial
infarction (STEMI) patients to hospitals capable of percutaneous coronary intervention
(PCI). The policy differentially affects patients living in areas of the city where the nearest
hospital is not a primary stroke center or PCI-capable as EMS crews transporting stroke and
STEMI incidents in these areas presumably bypass the nearest hospital to comply with the
destination policies, trading off a small increase in transportation time for improved access
xiv
to appropriate treatment at the destination. We find the destination policy for STEMI
patients results in the near elimination of patients admitted to non-PCI capable hospitals;
but that stroke regionalization has an economically small, but statistically significant effect
on transportation patterns for acute stroke patients. These differences likely stem from the
reliability of diagnosing stroke and STEMI in the pre-hospital setting.
xv
CHAPTER 1 : Volume Responses to Hospital Revenue Targets: Evidence from
Maryland’s Global Budget Revenue System
Health care spending in the United States is higher than in other industrialized countries
without commensurate returns to health; in addition, spending is growing at a faster rate
than income, consequently putting a strain on the U.S. economy and individual household
finances. Shifting financial risk to health care providers is one lever to change the level and
trajectory of health care spending. Along with the federal government, states are pioneering
health care reform, but vary in their approaches to shifting risk to health care providers. An
interesting case is Maryland’s all-payer system, which transitioned from per admission rate
regulation to a Global Budget Revenue (GBR) model for hospital care as a steppingstone
to full capitation based on total per capita cost of care.
This paper focuses on hospital responses to the Maryland GBR—a hospital payment sys-
tem that limits per hospital spending per year by constraining total hospital revenue to a
prospectively determined amount. Under the GBR system, hospitals are permitted to meet
their revenue targets by adjusting the reimbursement rates or by changing hospital volume,
or a combination thereof. Several studies have examined the impact of Maryland’s GBR
system on hospital utilization in the Medicare population using matched out of state Medi-
care beneficiaries as comparisons, but find differences in pre intervention trends, limiting
their ability to ascribe causality to the results (Roberts et al., 2018b; Beil et al., 2019).
This paper explores three within-Maryland hospital level measures of exposure to the pay-
ment system change. Five Maryland hospitals negotiated revenue exemptions from the
global budget—exempt categories include revenue from non-Maryland residents and/or
revenue for specific hospital service lines. I argue that the remaining 30 general acute
care hospitals without revenue streams exempt from the global budget more acutely feel
the pressure to reduce volume and/or adjust reimbursement rates than the five hospitals
with separate revenue streams. In a second measure of within-Maryland hospital exposure,
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I classify the 30 hospitals without revenue exclusions into two categories—hospitals with
above median growth in the predicted disease burden of their catchment area and hospitals
with below median growth. I calculate predicted disease burden following Costinot et al.
(2019), leveraging variation in the age-sex profile of hospitals’ catchment areas and variation
in the burden of disease by age and sex. Hospitals with above median growth in predicted
disease burden are more exposed to the payment system change to the extent that this
growth is not reflected in their total revenue targets. In a third measure, I separate the 30
hospitals without revenue exclusions into two groups based on predicted growth in inpatient
service lines. I construct an exposure-weighted measure of hospital inpatient growth, com-
monly known as a shift-share measure (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018; Borusyak et al.,
2018), using pre period growth in total charges by service line across all Maryland GBR
hospitals and each hospital’s share of admissions in a given service line. Hospitals with
above median predicted growth are more exposed to the GBR payment system change to
the extent that this growth is not reflected in their revenue targets.
Across all three measures, I find evidence of differences in pre intervention trends in hospital
inpatient volume between my more exposed and less exposed hospital groups. Inpatient
visits decreased faster at hospitals without revenue exclusions than at hospitals with revenue
exclusions prior to the payment system change. Inpatient visits to hospitals with above
median growth in predicted disease burden or above median predicted growth in inpatient
service lines decreased slower prior to the payment system change than did visits at hospitals
with below median values of these respective measures. I find no evidence that the Maryland
GBR payment system was associated with any deviation from pre intervention trends for
inpatient volume. I present descriptives for volume in these hospital settings due to limited
pre intervention data for observation and outpatient hospital volume.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1.1, I review the recent history of hospital payment
in Maryland and describe the GBR payment system. In Section 1.2, I discuss the relevant
literature. Section 1.3 presents a framework for thinking about hospital behavior under
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the GBR system. Section 1.4 describes my sample, defines my three measures of within-
Maryland exposure to the payment system change, and discusses the outcomes of interest.
Section 1.5 outlines my empirical approach, while Section 1.6 presents results. Section 1.7
summarizes limitations and concludes.
1.1. Policy Background
The state of Maryland is unique in its approach to paying hospitals. In this section I describe
Maryland’s history with all-payer rate regulation and the state’s transition to hospital global
budgets first for rural hospitals and then for all acute hospitals in the state.
1.1.1. Rate regulation
Since the late 1970s, Maryland has operated an all-payer rate setting system for hospital in-
patient and on-campus outpatient care. The impetus for rate regulation was a combination
of rising hospital costs and increasing levels of uncompensated care (Murray, 2009). Initiated
by hospital trustees and supported by the Maryland Hospital Association (MHA), legisla-
tion creating an authority to regulate hospital payment rates was passed by the Maryland
legislature in 1971. The Health Care Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC) remains
the rate regulating body today.
The original goal of rate regulation in Maryland was to control per admission spending.
This was accomplished by prospectively determining rates and constraining per admission
revenue for all payers. One vital part of the longevity in Maryland’s hospital payment
experiment has been cooperation of public payers—Medicare and Medicaid. In 1977, the
HSCRC negotiated a waiver with the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) under
which Medicare and Medicaid agreed to pay hospitals following the regulated rates.1 Still
true today, the rate setting authority determines the rates by which all payers must abide,
including Medicare and Medicaid which receive a six percent discount on the regulated rates.
Compared to national averages, Medicare and Medicaid reimburse above average and com-
1HCFA was the predecessor to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
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mercial insurers reimburse below average in Maryland. A second vital part of the continued
operation of Maryland’s all-payer rate regulation has been the skill and transparency of
regulators at the HSCRC, and commitment from policy makers, hospitals, payers, and the
public (Pauly and Town, 2012).
Although rate regulation in Maryland succeeded in controlling spending per admission, it
has not succeeded in controlling growth in total hospital spending. Between 1976 and 2000,
the HSCRC adjusted rates based on overages and underages in hospital volume. Rates
for new volume were set lower than rates for existing volume in an effort to reimburse for
only variable costs, as the original rate and volume determinations reflected fixed costs
(Advisory Board Health Policy, 2016). This volume adjustment was dropped in 2000 under
negotiations with the hospital industry, and over the next seven years hospital admissions
increased annually by 2.7 percent on average compared to the 1 percent national average over
the same time period (Murray, 2009). Between 2000 and 2008, the rate regulation system
encouraged hospital volume by reimbursing new volume at the same rates as historic volume
(Kalman et al., 2014; Pauly and Town, 2012). The volume adjustment was re-implemented
in 2008.
Maryland has also been an early adopter of pay-for-performance, including Quality-Based
Reimbursement (QBR) in 2009, Maryland Hospital Acquired Conditions (MHAC) in 2010,
the Admission-Readmission Revenue (ARR) program in 2011, and Readmission Shared
Savings Policy (RSSP) in 2013. Despite success in controlling per admission spending and
attempts to change incentives through pay for performance, Maryland risked losing it’s
original waiver after experiencing a period of spending growth that exceeded the national
average.
1.1.2. Global budgets
The impetus behind the payment system shift from per admission revenue regulation to
total revenue regulation was twofold. As discussed above, Maryland experienced a period
4
of spending growth that exceeded the national average. Both the state and CMS were
concerned that Maryland risked violating the terms of its original waiver. Second, regulating
costs per-admission was poorly aligned with pay-for-performance initiatives in the state and
the desire to focus on comprehensive coordinated care delivery (Haber et al., 2016).
In 2014, Maryland started a five year All-Payer Model Demonstration with CMS. To achieve
the terms of its updated waiver, and specifically the requirement to limit all-payer per capita
total hospital cost growth to 3.58%, Maryland transitioned all general acute care hospitals
to one of two global budget programs. Ten rural hospitals participate in the TPR payment
system.2 All remaining general hospitals participate in the GBR payment system. Both
systems set a limit on the total revenue a hospital can earn in a given year. The revenue
target applies to both inpatient and outpatient hospital services and all patients receiving
care in Maryland hospitals regardless of residence.3
Hospitals in the GBR system are given a prospectively determined global budgets based on
historic (2013) volume, costs, and utilization. Rates remain regulated by the rate setting
authority, but hospitals are allowed to adjust rates across all service lines within a 5%
corridor without prior approval and up to 10% with approval to meet their target. In
addition to assuming increased financial risk through the global payment, hospitals are
penalized or rewarded for rates of potentially avoidable utilization and performance in the
state’s quality based reimbursement program. A generalization of the target formula is
given below (Haber et al., 2016):
Revht = Revh,2013 · [(1 + Inflt +Adjt) · (1 + ∆V olht)]
where hospital h revenue in year t is limited to 2013 revenue adjusted for inflation Inflt,
a year specific adjustment Adjt, and allowed growth in hospital volume ∆V olht (changes
to market share, service area demographics, and rates of potentially avoidable utilization).
2Eight of the ten TPR rural hospitals have accepted global budget payments since 2010.
3Four hospitals negotiated revenue limits that excluded revenue for non-Maryland residents. More infor-
mation on these hospitals and exclusions is provided in Section 1.1.3.
5
Hospitals are penalized for both overruns and underruns in total revenue.
1.1.3. Hospitals with global budget-excluded revenue
The global budgets for four Maryland hospitals excluded revenue from non-Maryland resi-
dents in the first two years of the GBR system. The University of Maryland Medical Center,
the Johns Hopkins Hospital, Suburban Hospital (also within the Johns Hopkins Health Sys-
tem), and Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center each had non-resident revenue excluded
from the hospital’s global budget. Payment rates for non-resident visits to these hospitals
are regulated by the HSCRC, but non-resident volume for these four hospitals remained
unconstrained by the global budget. The University of Maryland Medical Center operated
under this revenue exclusion for non-residents through June 2015; while the three Johns
Hopkins Health System hospitals kept this revenue exclusion through June 2017.
In addition to the exclusion of non-resident revenue from the global budget, three of the four
hospitals negotiated carve outs of specific service lines from their global budgets. Revenues
from burn cases at the Johns Hopkins Hospital and Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical center
are excluded from the global budget (Health Services Cost Review Commission, 2014a).
Global budgets for the University of Maryland Medical Center and the Johns Hopkins
Hospital do not include revenue from inpatient solid organ transplants, inpatient and out-
patient blood marrow transplants, inpatient oncology research, inpatient oncology transfers
in, inpatient hematologic malignancies, and inpatient transfers in from acute care hospitals
as these facilities are considered “statewide resource[s] for tertiary and quaternary care”
(Health Services Cost Review Commission, 2014a,b).
The University of Maryland Charles Regional Medical Center is the fifth Maryland hospital
participating in the GBR that negotiated revenue exclusions from the hospital global budget,
specifically revenues for services covered under Medicare Part B (Health Services Cost
Review Commission, 2014b). Part B covers diagnostic and treatment services in the hospital
outpatient and observation settings (Medicare.gov, 2019). Rates for these services remain
6
regulated by the HSCRC, but volume is not limited by the global budget.
1.2. Literature
This paper draws from and contributes to research on hospital budgets in Maryland, which
I discuss in this section.
Several studies have examined Maryland’s Total Patient Revenue (TPR) program, with
mixed results. Mortensen et al. (2014) study the effect of TPR on hospital readmissions
through the first 18 months of the policy (starting July 1, 2010) for eight of those rural
hospitals. The authors use inpatient discharge data to compare hospital readmissions for
the eight treated hospitals to three rural non-treated hospitals and 30 total non-treated
Maryland hospitals for the 18 month periods pre and post intervention using a difference-
in-difference linear probability model. Results of this study find no effect of the TPR on
hospital readmissions.
Focusing on Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries, Roberts et al. (2018a) similarly use an
in-state comparison group. The authors identify beneficiaries residing in zip codes that are
at least 15 minutes farther to a TPR hospital than all other hospitals for the comparison
sample. They estimate the differential change in hospital stays, emergency department
visits, and price-standardized measures of inpatient and outpatient hospital spending three
years after the program implementation. Despite pursuing multiple sensitivity analyses, the
authors do not find evidence the TPR program changed inpatient admissions, observation
stays, emergency department visits, or hospital spending.
Pines et al. (2019) compare changes in inpatient admissions, emergency department visits,
and hospital outpatient visits at the eight TPR hospitals to changes at seven non-TPR
Maryland hospitals before and after the TPR system implementation. This paper differs
from the study by Roberts et al. (2018a) in that utilization for all payers, not just Medi-
care, is examined. Pines et al. (2019) find that the TPR decreased inpatient admissions,
admissions from the emergency department, and hospital outpatient visits in the first three
7
years of the system.
Malmmose et al. (2018) study the same eight rural hospitals operating under TPR to deter-
mine the impact of the program implementation on hospitals’ reported revenues, expenses,
and margins. In their common size analysis the authors examine gross and net patient
revenue, other operating revenue, and expenses for regulated and unregulated services as
well as non-operating revenue and expenses 2007 through 2013. They find a decrease in
growth of gross revenue for both treatment and control hospitals, consisting of an increase
in growth of unregulated gross revenue in treatment hospitals but a decrease in control hos-
pitals. Malmmose et al. (2018) also find evidence that the TPR program shifted costs from
regulated to non-regulated settings, and explain that some treatment hospitals subsidized
non-employed physicians to align incentives—an expense that is recorded as an unregulated
cost.
Roberts et al. (2018b) examine the first two years of the GBR system, and specifically the
program’s impact on hospital and primary care utilization in the Medicare fee-for-service
population. The authors focus on beneficiaries residing in eight Maryland counties served
by 32 of the 36 GBR hospitals participating in the inaugural year of the policy change.
The authors use coarsened exact matching to identify control counties outside of Maryland.
Many aspects of this paper are of interest. First, the authors find evidence of violation
of the parallel trends assumption underlying the difference-in-differences estimator. As
the authors acknowledge, differences in pre intervention trends will bias the difference-
in-differences estimates. They report finding a statistically significant decrease in return
hospital stays and increase in primary care visits. The authors specify an additional set
of analyses that allow for differences in pre-intervention trends, and find the policy change
to be associated with a statistically significant decrease in hospital stays but no change in
primary care visits. They conclude that there is no consistent evidence of change to hospital
and primary care utilization in the Medicare fee-for-service population resulting from the
GBR.
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Beil et al. (2019) combine findings from the first three years of the CMS evaluation of the
GBR payment system change. Similar to Roberts et al. (2018b), the authors find evidence
of differences in pre intervention trends in outcomes for Maryland Medicare beneficiaries
and matched comparison Medicare beneficiaries residing outside of Maryland. The authors
modify their empirical approach to allow the intervention and comparison groups to follow
different trends over the study period and find decreases in hospital spending and inpatient
admissions for Maryland beneficiaries after the GBR. As the authors do not present standard
difference-in-difference results without allowing for differences in pre intervention trends, it
is not possible to determine whether the addition of pre intervention trends changed their
findings.
Galarraga et al. (2019) examine the impact of the GBR on admissions from the emergency
department (ED) by comparing four MedStar Maryland hospitals to two MedStar D.C.
hospitals before and after the payment system change in a difference-in-difference design.
The authors find evidence that admissions from the ED were declining prior to the GBR
in Maryland while admissions from the ED in D.C. hospitals were stable, and possibly
increasing. They apply a standard difference-in-difference framework including hospital and
year fixed effects despite evidence of differences in pre 2014 trends, and find that admissions
from the ED declined in Maryland following the GBR relative to changes in D.C.
Existing studies of the Maryland GBR, at the hospital or area level, have used out of state
comparison groups with limited success. This paper contributes to the study of hospital
budgets in Maryland by exploring three within Maryland measures of hospital exposure.
Further, I estimate the effect of the GBR on hospital volume across all payers, assuming the
existence of pre intervention trends for at least two of the within Maryland measures—above
median growth in predicted disease burden, and above median predicted growth in inpatient
service lines.
This paper contributes to the study of Maryland global budgets, first by examining changes
at the hospital level across all payers. Prior work on the GBR has compared utilization at
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the beneficiary or area level and focused on the Medicare population. Second, I develop
three measures exposure within Maryland.
1.3. Conceptual Framework
In this section I provide intuition for thinking about hospital behavior under the GBR
payment system.
Suppose there are three types of hospital volume: volume that the hospital cannot influence
and must provide e (e.g., motor vehicle accidents, stabilization), volume that the hospital
can influence by providing primary care in the community setting (b) but must treat when
presented to the hospital g (e.g., acute complications from diabetes), and volume that the
hospital cannot influence through primary care and has discretion in providing d (e.g.,
pregnancy). Prior to the payment system change, per admission revenue was set through
rate regulation by the HSCRC with admissions from all payers reimbursed the same rate.
Assume that these three types of volume each earn the same reimbursement, pv, and that
hospitals are reimbursed pb for primary care provided in the community, with pb < pv
Hospital profit under rate regulation is given by:
π = pv (e+ g(b) + d) + pbb− C(e, g(b), d, b) (1.1)
where g(b) is a function of hospital-provided community primary care b and C(.) is the cost
function. Assuming that hospital utility is solely a function of profit, the objective of the
hospital under rate regulation is to maximize π through it’s choice of d and b. Taking first
order conditions of 1.1:
w.r.t. d : pv −
∂C
∂d
= 0
w.r.t. b : pv
∂g(b)
∂b
+ pb −
∂C
∂b
− ∂C
∂g(b)
∂g(b)
∂b
= 0
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Hospitals will provide discretionary volume d to the point where the marginal cost of the
visit is equal to the marginal reimbursement. Rearranging the second condition:
pb =
∂C
∂b
+
∂C
∂g(b)
∂g(b)
∂b
− pv
∂g(b)
∂b
Assuming that C ′(.) > 0 and ∂g(b)∂b < 0, if lost hospital revenue from providing community
primary care pv
∂g(b)
∂b is greater than the hospital cost offset from moving care out of the
hospital ∂C∂g(b)
∂g(b)
∂b , the hospital acts as if it has a higher effective marginal cost, providing
a lower level of b than it would otherwise.
Suppose ∂g(b)∂b = −1, a one unit increase in b decreases g(b) by one unit. The hospital
provides primary care in the community b to the point where the difference in reimbursement
is equal to the difference in marginal costs:
pb =
∂C
∂b
− ∂C
∂g(b)
+ pv
If I further assume that pv >
∂C
∂g(b) , the hospital acts as if it has a higher marginal cost to
providing b and thereby provides less than it otherwise would.
If e were to increase under rate regulation, the hospital would make no change to the amount
of d or b provided, as e does not enter their first order conditions. If g(b) we to increase under
rate regulation, the marginal cost of g(b), ∂C∂g(b) , would be higher, meaning the hospital’s
effective marginal cost of providing b would be lower, and the hospital increases the amount
of community primary care b provided.
The GBR system introduced a total hospital revenue constraint, Y , and additionally per-
mitted the hospital to adjust payment rates above a regulated floor rate p
v
and below a reg-
ulated ceiling rate pv. While adjusting pv may increase fixed costs (e.g., cost to train billing
department to monitor and adjust rates), it does not affect variable costs. Hospitals choose
d, b, and pv to maximize profits subject to the revenue constraint Y = pv (e+ g(b) + d) and
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the constraints on reimbursement pv.
L(d, b, pv) = pv (e+ g(b) + d) + pbb− C(e, g(b), d, b)
+ λ (Y − pv (e+ g(b) + d)) + µ1(pv − pv) + µ2(pv − pv) (1.2)
Taking first order KKT optimality conditions:
w.r.t. d : pv −
∂C
∂d
− λpv = 0
w.r.t. b : pv
∂g(b)
∂b
+ pb −
∂C
∂b
− ∂C
∂g(b)
∂g(b)
∂b
− λ
(
pv
∂g(b)
∂b
)
= 0
w.r.t. pv : e+ g(b) + d− λ(e+ g(b) + d) + µ1 − µ2
Y = pv (e+ g(b) + d)
µ1(pv − pv) = 0
µ1 ≥ 0
pv − pv ≥ 0
µ2(pv − pv) = 0
µ2 ≥ 0
pv − pv ≥ 0
One could imagine a number of scenarios in which e or g(b) increases at a faster rate than
growth in Y—perhaps the disease burden of the community served by the hospital grows
faster than growth reflected in Y . To meet Y a hospital would need to decrease pv or d, or
increase b to decrease g(b). Because increasing b is costly, ∂C∂b > 0, the hospital will reduce
either discretionary volume d or pv. If we imagine that decreasing d is also costly—in terms
of reputation (not modeled here) or penalties served by the HSCRC—hospitals will decrease
pv to meet Y.
I empirically test for whether hospitals more exposed to the revenue target respond by
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decreasing total volume, e + g(b) + d. Future work could assess changes separately by e,
g(b), and d.
1.4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this section I describe the sources of data used in my analyses, outline my sample con-
struction, define three ways to measure within-Maryland hospital exposure to the payment
system change, and define my outcomes of interest. Additionally, I provide descriptive
statistics on inpatient, outpatient, and observation visits in the year prior to the payment
system change; and present baseline measurements of my outcomes of interest.
1.4.1. Sample Definitions
The main data used in this analysis are from the Health Services Cost Review Commission
(HSCRC), which is also Maryland’s rate regulating authority. I use hospital inpatient
discharge data July 1, 2009 through June 30, 2017 (4.5 pre policy years and 3.5 post policy
years); hospital observation data July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2017 (1.5 pre policy years
and 3.5 post policy years); and hospital outpatient discharge data July 1, 2012 through
June 30, 2017 (1.5 pre policy years and 3.5 post policy years). The data describe hospital
utilization for all hospitals providing acute care located in Maryland. I make several sample
restrictions, as described in Table 1. Importantly, I keep only the 35 general hospitals
participating in the GBR with complete pre period data.4 In total, I exclude 14 percent
of inpatient visits July 2009 - June 2017; 12 percent of observation stays July 2012 - June
2017; and 16 percent of outpatient visits July 2012 - June 2017.
4I exclude the University of Maryland Rehabilitation and Orthopeadic Institute and the Levindale Hebrew
Geriatric Center and Hospital, both of which are regulated by the GBR but provide limited inpatient services;
three free standing emergency departments which are regulated by the GBR—Germantown Emergency
Center, Queen Anne’s Emergency Center, Bowie Emergency Center; and Holy Cross Germantown Hospital,
which opened after the implementation of the GBR payment system.
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Table 1: Maryland hospital inpatient, observation, and outpatient visits, sample exclusions
Inpatient Observation Outpatient
All visits 5,420,891 357,358 28,007,389
Non-short term acute visit 26,781 501 79,516
Invalid admission or discharge status 58,598 2,918 520,540
Other invalid field 402 1,736 48,300
Invalid or missing zip code 22,414 666 109,897
Closed hospital or non-GBR 601,389 35,619 2,965,146
Facility regulated by GBR but excluded from analysis 41,399 1,301 643,098
Excluded visits 750,983 42,741 4,366,497
Included visits 4,669,908 314,617 23,640,892
Source: Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC inpatient discharge data, July
2009 - June 2017, observation discharge data July 2012 - June 2017, outpatient discharge data July
2012 - June 2017.
1.4.2. Within-Maryland measures of hospital exposure
As discussed in Section 2.2, studies of the GBR are limited by selection of an appropriate
comparison group. Though a possible comparison group of hospitals could consist of fa-
cilities operating in the surrounding regions of the District of Columbia (D.C.), Delaware,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, or West Virginia, I outline several differences in the timing and ex-
tent of Medicaid expansions that are likely correlated with both exposure to the GBR and
with hospital utilization. First, Maryland has provided insurance coverage for low income
adults since July 2007 under a Section 1115 waiver, with these low income adults expanded
to full Medicaid benefits under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) Medicaid expansion in 2014
(Medicaid.gov, 2019b; Blumberg et al., 2012). D.C. adopted a full Medicaid expansion early,
in 2010, through a Section 1115 waiver and early ACA federal matching funds (The Kaiser
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2012; The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, 2014). Delaware and West Virginia expanded Medicaid in 2014, Pennsylvania
expanded Medicaid in 2015, and Virginia expanded in 2019. In addition to differences in
timings of Medicaid expansions by regions surrounding Maryland, there are differences in
the extent of the expansions. D.C. offers more generous expansion, covering higher levels of
low income adults than Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Both Maryland
and D.C. offer more inclusive coverage levels for traditionally covered Medicaid populations
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of pregnant women and children than dp Pennsylvania and Virginia (Medicaid.gov, 2019c).
From the Oregon Health Insurance experiment, we know that Medicaid expansion increases
emergency department utilization and hospitalizations (Taubman et al., 2014; Finkelstein
et al., 2012). Using hospitals from any of the surrounding regions could confound the effects
of Medicaid expansion and the GBR payment system change.5
In this section, I discuss three within-Maryland measures of hospital exposure to the pay-
ment system change: absence or presence of revenue exclusions from the target, above/below
median growth in predicted disease burden of the hospital catchment area, and above/below
median predicted growth in inpatient service lines.
Hospitals with revenue exclusions from the GBR
As discussed in Section 1.1.3, five hospitals negotiated revenue exclusions from their global
budgets. As a result of revenue exclusions from the global budget, these hospitals may
be less incentivized to reduce hospital volume than Maryland hospitals without revenue
exclusions from the global budget. My first measure of within-Maryland exposure to the
global budget compares the 30 hospitals without revenue exclusions to these five hospitals
with exclusions. I examine overall volume by inpatient, observation, and outpatient setting
though the revenue exclusions apply more specifically. Future work could examine the
association between revenue exclusions and changes in the specific service lines or groups
of patients to which they apply.
Table 2 compares baseline, 2013, admission characteristics for the 30 hospitals without rev-
enue exclusions and the 5 hospitals with revenue exclusions. Patients admitted to hospitals
without revenue exclusions are more likely to be female on average than patients admitted to
hospitals with revenue exclusions; older on average than patients admitted to hospitals with
revenue exclusions; more likely to be a race other than white or black; and are more likely to
5The regions also differ in the extent of managed care penetration. Maryland and Delaware operate
mandatory managed care enrollment for most Medicaid enrollees, while other states do not (Medicaid.gov,
2019b,a).
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be Maryland residents than patients admitted to hospitals with revenue exclusions. There
are no statistically significant differences in characteristics of observation stay patients be-
tween the two groups of hospitals in the year prior to the payment system change. Patients
visiting the outpatient setting of hospitals without revenue exclusions are more likely to be
female, older, and more likely to have Medicare insurance or be uninsured, ceteris paribus.
Similar to the inpatient setting, I find that patients in the outpatient setting of hospitals
without revenue exclusions are more likely to be Maryland residents than are patients in
the outpatient setting of hospitals with revenue exclusions.
Table 2: Baseline visit characteristics for hospitals with and without revenue exclusions,
2013
Inpatient Observation Outpatient
No revenue Any revenue No revenue Any revenue No revenue Any revenue
excluded excluded excluded excluded excluded excluded
Female 59.36 50.81 *** 59.42 57.77 60.62 55.57 ***
Age
0-14 13.74 12.45 3.05 4.18 9.68 12.95
15-34 17.90 18.34 11.30 11.91 23.73 22.04
35-49 14.15 16.62 ** 19.56 21.15 18.72 19.13
50-64 20.50 25.25 *** 29.67 29.38 23.42 26.83 ***
65+ 33.70 27.35 36.42 33.39 24.46 19.06
Race
White 49.39 55.24 49.98 50.42 50.38 51.27
Black 33.44 35.43 43.31 42.32 40.63 38.36
Other race 17.17 9.33 ** 6.70 7.26 8.99 10.37
Hispanic/Latino origin/descent 5.22 3.14 3.04 2.81 4.17 3.00
Payer
Commercial 34.41 34.07 30.78 29.84 39.46 42.22
Medicare 38.05 32.51 40.55 38.00 27.37 21.89 ***
Medicaid 20.30 25.69 17.96 22.65 20.52 26.22
Uninsured 5.51 5.41 8.78 7.51 10.09 5.47 ***
Other government 1.34 1.78 1.37 1.62 1.74 2.44
Other/unknown payer 0.39 0.54 0.57 0.39 0.82 1.76 ***
Maryland resident 95.59 89.34 * 95.48 96.30 95.38 89.24 *
N 30 5 30 5 30 5
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
Pooled means are weighted by number of admissions. Standard errors used to estimate p-values clustered
by hospital.
Source: Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission discharge data 2013.
Hospitals serving areas with higher growth in disease burden
My second measure of within-Maryland hospital exposure to the payment system change
uses pre period growth in the predicted disease burden of the hospital’s catchment area
to separate the 30 hospitals without revenue exclusions into two groups—those with above
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median growth in predicted disease burden and those with below median growth in predicted
disease burden. The measure of predicted disease burden comes directly from Costinot et al.
(2019) who use cross-sectional variation in disease burden by country as a demand shifter
to test the home-market effect for pharmaceuticals.6 Their approach is based on Acemoglu
and Linn (2004) who use variation in demographic composition over time in the U.S. to
develop a plausibly exogenous measure of market size for pharmaceuticals.
I combine annual measures of Maryland’s all-cause disease burden from the Institute of
Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) with annual zip code tabulation area (ZCTA) pop-
ulation by age and sex from American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates to mea-
sure the predicted disease burden of a zip code in a given year (Global Burden of Disease
Collaborative Network, 2018). I define hospital catchment areas using the primary and sec-
ondary service areas defined by the hospital GBR agreements negotiated with the HSCRC.
Primary and secondary services combined represent 75 percent of the hospital’s 2013 admis-
sions. All hospitals define their primary and secondary service areas at the zip code level,
except for Peninsula Regional Medical Center which uses counties. I map the zip codes
and counties to ZCTAs used by the ACS. Several hospitals include non-Maryland zip codes
in their service areas, so I calculate predicted disease burden for these out of state areas
following the same procedure.
Disease burden is used to measure mortality and morbidity at a population level and was
first used in the World Bank’s 1993 World Development Report (World Bank, 1993). It
is defined as the sum of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) over a population, where
a single DALY corresponds to one lost year of “healthy” life (World Health Organization,
2019). Predicted disease burden for ZCTA z in a given year is calculated as per capita
disease burden for an age-sex cohort, as, weighted by the ZCTA’s population in that age-
6The home-market effect in the pharmaceutical industry predicts that countries with larger local demand
for drugs have larger sales of drugs abroad (Costinot et al., 2019).
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sex cohort and summed over all age-sex cohorts (Costinot et al., 2019):
PDBz =
∑
as
[
populationzas ×
disease burdenas∑
z populationzas
]
(1.3)
Due to limitations in the granularity of measures of disease burden in the United States,
I measure disease burden for the state of Maryland overall. Unlike Costinot et al. (2019),
I am unable to exclude a ZCTA’s own measure of disease burden from disease burdenas∑
z populationzas
. In
other words, this ratio does not vary by ZCTA—it is the total Maryland all cause disease
burden for a given age-sex cohort divided by the total Maryland population in that age-sex
cohort in a given year.
Figure 1: Age profiles across Maryland ZCTAs, 2013
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Figure 1 visually shows the variation in age by Maryland ZCTAs that are part of at least
one GBR hospital’s catchment area. I plot the share of each area’s population under 65
years of age in 2013. The majority of areas range between just above 70 percent and just
below 95 percent of the population below age 65. The size of the the circles corresponds to
the ZCTA’s total 2013 population. Areas at the tail ends of the graph are those with small
overall populations.
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Figure 2: Maryland disease burden by age-sex cohort
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Figure 2 visually shows the variation in disease burden by age-sex cohort for the 2013
Maryland population. Excluding the initial four years of life for both sexes, disease burden
per capita increases with age, with female disease burden below male disease burden starting
with age 50 years.
After calculating the predicted disease burden in each ZCTA in each year prior to the
payment system change following Equation 1.3, I aggregate the measures to the hospital
year level using the hospital’s defined catchment area. I calculate the year over year growth
in each hospital’s predicted disease burden, and take the simple average of these growth
rates across the pre period years. I separate hospitals by the median average growth rate
in predicted disease burden.
Table 3 compares baseline, 2013, admission characteristics for the 15 hospitals with above
median growth in predicted disease burden to baseline admission characteristics for the 15
hospitals with below median growth. Patients admitted to hospitals with above median
growth are younger on average, more likely to have commercial insurance, and less likely to
be uninsured than patients admitted to hospitals with below median growth in predicted
disease burden. Patients staying as observation status in hospitals with above median
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growth are older, more likely to have commercial insurance coverage, and less likely to have
Medicaid insurance coverage than their counterpart patients at hospitals with below median
growth. There are an additional number of economically, but not statistically, significant
differences in the characteristics of patients treated at hospitals with above median growth,
most notably differences in racial composition.
Table 3: Baseline visit characteristics for hospitals above and below median growth in
predicted disease burden, 2013
Inpatient Observation Outpatient
Above Below Above Below Above Below
median median median median median median
Female 60.42 57.93 59.68 59.20 59.51 61.76
Age
0-14 15.90 10.82 * 3.59 2.57 11.41 7.91 **
15-34 18.17 17.54 10.29 12.20 22.44 25.05
35-49 13.35 15.24 17.76 21.15 ** 17.96 19.49 *
50-64 18.50 23.21 * 27.75 31.37 ** 22.08 24.78
65+ 34.07 33.20 40.62 32.71 ** 26.12 22.77
Race
White 54.30 42.74 54.59 45.92 55.49 45.16
Black 32.07 35.28 36.94 48.94 34.29 47.11
Other race 13.62 21.98 8.47 5.14 10.22 7.73
Hispanic/Latino origin/descent 6.13 3.98 3.49 2.65 5.43 2.89
Payer
Commercial 38.00 29.56 * 34.12 27.83 * 41.42 37.46
Medicare 37.17 39.26 42.42 38.89 27.71 27.01
Medicaid 18.46 22.78 12.96 22.36 *** 18.41 22.67
Uninsured 4.54 6.82 * 8.18 9.30 9.98 10.20
Other government 1.34 1.34 1.31 1.41 1.67 1.81
Other/unknown payer 0.49 0.25 1.00 0.20 0.81 0.84
Maryland resident 94.98 96.42 94.59 96.26 94.22 96.56
N 15 15 15 15 15 15
Pooled means are weighted by number of admissions. Standard errors used to estimate
p-values clustered by hospital.
Source: Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission discharge data 2013.
Hospitals treating faster growing service lines
A third way to classify hospitals is by predicted growth in spending. Spending on certain
service lines is growing faster than spending on others due to advancements in technology
or drugs, and hospitals vary in the breadth and depth of service lines they offer. Instead
of using observed hospital growth in inpatient charges, I combine state-wide growth in
inpatient charges by service line with each hospital’s service line share to calculate an
exposure-weighted average of growth in charges, what is commonly referred to as a shift-
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share measure (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018; Borusyak et al., 2018). Hospitals with
above median exposure-weighted growth in charges may more acutely feel the constraint
on total revenue to the extent that this growth is not completely reflected in the revenue
target.
The Maryland hospital utilization data report charges, not actual spending, but to the
extent that growth in total charges reflects growth in both utilization and in price, total
charges can be used to identify growth in service lines. Another concern with using total
charges in Maryland is that per admission revenue growth was regulated by the HSCRC
prior to the payment system change. If growth in per admission revenue was uniformly
regulated across hospital and service line, any variation I find in growth of total charges
reflects growth in utilization only.
I start by grouping inpatient admissions for all 35 GBR general acute care hospitals and
additionally acute inpatient visits from the University of Maryland Rehabilitation and Or-
thopeadic Institute and the Levindale Hebrew Geriatric Center and Hospital (both of which
are regulated by the GBR but provide limited inpatient services) by primary diagnosis on
the visit using the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Clinical Classifica-
tions Software (CCS). Specifically, I collapse the primary diagnois on the visit to one of
135 HCUP CCS “second-level categories.” These second-level categories aggregate to 17
first-level categories. For example, within the first-level category of neoplasms there are 16
second-level categories including breast cancer, ovarian cancer, and colorectal cancer. In
this text, I refer to these first-level categories as hospital service lines.
I next calculate year over year growth in total charges for each second-level category across
all inpatient facilities.7 At the first-level category, I take the average of all second-level
category growth rates across all pre period years. Figure 3 shows the average pre period
growth in charges across these 17 first-level categories, or service lines. Among the condi-
7I annualize charges for 2009 by doubling the total amount observed in the last six months of 2009. This
assumes that the first half of the year experienced the same patterns of utilization and price as the second
half of the year.
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tions with the highest pre period growth rates in total charges are infectious and parasitic
diseases, neoplasms, disease of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue, congenital
anomolies, perinatal conditions, and injuries and poisonings.
Figure 3: Average growth in total inpatient charges by HCUP diagnosis category,
2009-2013
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ICD-9-CM.
I take the share of hospital pre period admissions in each service line, shl. Figure 4 shows
the share of each hospital’s inpatient admissions in each of the 17 service lines. In the most
extreme example of this variation, over 80% of the University of Maryland Rehabilitation
and Orthopeadic Institute’s inpatient admissions were for diseases of the musculoskeletal
system and connective tissue, as would be expected. Following the shift-share literature, I
take the product of shl and the industry-level growth rate, ḡl and sum the products over
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service lines to construct a hospital level measure of predicted growth:
zh =
∑
l
(shlḡl) (1.4)
I split my sample of 30 hospitals without revenue exclusions into those with above median
zh and those with below median zh.
Figure 4: Service line share of hospital admissions, 2009-2013
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Table 4 compares visit characteristics for hospitals with above median zh to visit character-
istics for hospitals with below median zh. There are few statistically significant differences
between hospitals with above/below median predicted growth in the characteristics of inpa-
tient and observation stays, but there are a number of economically significant differences.
First, inpatient visits to hospitals with above median predicted growth are younger; while
observation visits to hospitals with above median predicted growth are older. Inpatient
visits to hospitals with above median predicted growth in service lines are more likely to be
covered by commercial insurance—corresponding to the lower average age—than inpatient
23
visits to hospitals with below median predicted growth. These inpatient age and insurance
coverage differences are not surprising, as Figure 3 showed charges for both perinatal con-
ditions and congenital anomalies were increasing in the pre intervention period. There are
a number of statistically significant differences between the two hospitals groups in terms
of sex and insurance payer for outpatient visits, with patients in the outpatient setting of
hospitals with above median predicted growth being older and more likely to have commer-
cial or Medicare insurance coverage and less likely to have Medicaid insurance coverage.
There are also economically significant, but not statistically significant, differences in race
between the groups across in the inpatient and outpatient setting.
Table 4: Baseline visit characteristics for hospitals above and below median growth in
service lines, 2013
Inpatient Observation Outpatient
Above Below Above Below Above Below
median median median median median median
Female 60.42 57.80 58.87 59.91 61.43 59.34
Age
0-14 15.65 10.95 3.18 2.93 9.03 10.72
15-34 18.30 17.33 12.01 10.67 21.58 27.14 ***
35-49 13.49 15.12 * 18.25 20.73 17.96 19.93 **
50-64 19.33 22.21 28.00 31.17 * 24.21 22.15
65+ 33.23 34.38 38.56 34.50 27.22 20.06 **
Race
White 51.96 45.63 50.46 49.56 52.73 46.65
Black 34.74 31.53 42.68 43.88 38.85 43.47
Other race 13.30 22.84 6.86 6.56 8.42 9.89
Hispanic/Latino origin/descent 5.47 4.84 3.63 2.52 4.26 4.03
Payer
Commercial 37.94 29.26 * 33.40 28.44 42.09 35.28 **
Medicare 36.53 40.28 41.29 39.88 29.38 24.16 *
Medicaid 19.39 21.63 15.16 20.45 17.55 25.25 **
Uninsured 4.93 6.36 8.60 8.94 9.20 11.51
Other government 0.92 1.95 0.91 1.77 1.13 2.71 *
Other/unknown payer 0.29 0.52 0.63 0.52 0.66 1.09
Maryland resident 94.83 96.70 94.09 96.72 94.46 96.85
N 15 15 15 15 15 15
Pooled means are weighted by number of admissions. Standard errors used to estimate
p-values clustered by hospital.
Source: Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission discharge data 2013.
Table 5 presents the three measures of within-Maryland hospital exposure for each facility
regulated by the GBR. Hospitals with revenue exclusions are listed first, and are not included
in the other measures of exposure. The final rows list the six facilities regulated by the GBR
but not included in my analysis.
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1.4.3. Outcomes
I focus on measures of total hospital volume, as outside of changing reimbursement rates,
changing volume is the only way for hospitals to meet revenue targets. Specifically, I look at
inpatient visits per hospital, observation stays per hospital, ED visits per hospital, non-ED
outpatient visits per hospital; and the number of procedures in each of the aforementioned
settings. I also examine inpatient days. Visits, days, and services are three types of hospital
volume. In a fee-for-service setting, hospital total revenue would be determined by the mix
of visits, days, and services. Increasing visits, days, or services would increase revenue.
In the GBR, setting increasing visits, days, or services generally does not change hospital
revenue.
Inpatient procedures per visit are defined as the unique count of International Classification
of Diseases 9th Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) procedure codes or ICD-10-Procedure
Coding System (PCS) codes, while observation and outpatient procedures per visit are
defined as the unique count of Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS)
codes.
I do not expect to find any changes to the number of emergency department visits. Rewards
from investing in community health or preventative care are unlikely to accrue in the form
of reduced ED use in the short term and incentives for patients have not changed. In the
inpatient setting, I expect to find a decrease in visits if hospitals reduce “discretionary”
services, improve the health of the population served, or move patients on the margin to
the outpatient or observation setting. If this is the case, the average number of services
provided in the inpatient setting could increase or decrease—as patients remaining in the
inpatient setting may be more complex. In the outpatient setting, I would expect to see
a decrease in outpatient non-ED visits if hospitals are trying to move care to non-hospital
based settings, but I could find an increase if hospitals are moving patients on the margin
from the inpatient to the outpatient setting.
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Tables 6 through 8 present 2013 baseline levels of these outcomes by the three measures of
within-Maryland exposure.
Table 6: Unadjusted outcomes per quarter for hospitals with and without revenue exclu-
sions, pre and post GBR
No revenue excluded Any revenue excluded
Pre Post Pre Post
Inpatient visits 4,096.74 3,489.59 6,440.79 5,891.03
(2,035.80) (2,009.06) (3,700.67) (3,590.89)
Days per inpatient visit 3.99 4.22 4.86 5.31
(0.46) (0.57) (0.88) (1.33)
Services per inpatient visit 1.47 1.43 1.75 1.98
(0.48) (0.41) (0.44) (0.72)
Inpatient hospital-quarters 540 420 90 70
Observation visits 405.11 492.05 309.70 367.80
(275.09) (296.76) (168.20) (150.60)
Services per observation visit 21.04 20.76 19.21 20.34
(2.12) (1.74) (3.23) (1.74)
Observation hospital-quarters 180 420 30 70
ED visits 12,623.10 12,164.38 12,963.90 13,125.30
(4,313.37) (4,172.07) (3,672.15) (3,834.95)
Services per ED visit 6.07 6.19 6.01 6.57
(0.84) (0.76) (0.66) (0.76)
Non-ED outpatient visits 14,487.28 14,069.73 62,643.23 65,081.59
(11,028.05) (11,214.19) (61,291.37) (65,299.25)
Services per non-ED outpatient visit 3.47 3.73 3.37 3.72
(0.81) (0.98) (0.75) (1.07)
Outpatient hospital-quarters 180 420 30 70
ED = emergency department. Services defined using unique procedure codes per admission.
Source: Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission inpatient discharge data July
2008 - June 2017, observation and outpatient discharge data July 2012 - June 2017.
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Table 7: Unadjusted outcomes per quarter for hospitals above and below median growth in
predicted disease burden, pre and post GBR
Above median Below median
Pre Post Pre Post
Inpatient visits 4,577.49 4,003.71 3,615.99 2,975.46
(2,330.58) (2,298.21) (1,552.04) (1,509.63)
Days per inpatient visit 3.92 4.14 4.07 4.30
(0.37) (0.51) (0.53) (0.61)
Services per inpatient visit 1.45 1.41 1.48 1.46
(0.45) (0.45) (0.51) (0.37)
Inpatient hospital-quarters 270 210 270 210
Observation visits 371.51 499.70 438.71 484.39
(238.71) (280.62) (304.84) (312.55)
Services per observation visit 20.83 20.64 21.25 20.88
(2.41) (1.90) (1.77) (1.57)
Observation hospital-quarters 90 210 90 210
ED visits 13,301.93 13,020.50 11,944.27 11,308.27
(4,183.63) (4,519.97) (4,357.12) (3,604.53)
Services per ED visit 6.19 6.43 5.95 5.95
(0.73) (0.55) (0.94) (0.86)
Non-ED outpatient visits 14,099.11 13,494.96 14,875.46 14,644.50
(8,595.84) (9,390.83) (13,054.08) (12,777.56)
Services per non-ED outpatient visit 3.64 3.90 3.30 3.56
(0.91) (1.00) (0.66) (0.92)
Outpatient hospital-quarters 90 210 90 210
ED = emergency department. Services defined using unique procedure codes per
admission.
Source: Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission inpatient discharge data July
2008 - June 2017, observation and outpatient discharge data July 2012 - June 2017.
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Table 8: Unadjusted outcomes per quarter for hospitals hospitals above and below median
predicted service line growth, pre and post GBR
Above median Below median
Pre Post Pre Post
Inpatient visits 4,781.94 4,271.93 3,411.54 2,707.24
(2,042.81) (2,020.77) (1,785.73) (1,666.87)
Days per inpatient visit 3.95 4.12 4.03 4.31
(0.43) (0.57) (0.50) (0.55)
Services per inpatient visit 1.68 1.58 1.26 1.29
(0.38) (0.33) (0.48) (0.43)
Inpatient hospital-quarters 270 210 270 210
Observation visits 383.12 483.82 427.10 500.27
(236.58) (250.15) (308.62) (337.41)
Services per observation visit 21.16 20.73 20.92 20.79
(2.16) (1.59) (2.08) (1.89)
Observation hospital-quarters 90 210 90 210
ED visits 13,310.62 13,386.25 11,935.58 10,942.51
(3,771.77) (3,876.19) (4,715.62) (4,107.38)
Services per ED visit 6.31 6.39 5.83 6.00
(0.88) (0.72) (0.73) (0.75)
Non-ED outpatient visits 19,838.33 19,204.48 9,136.23 8,934.98
(12,571.86) (12,698.13) (5,351.59) (6,155.60)
Services per non-ED outpatient visit 3.36 3.62 3.58 3.83
(0.59) (0.67) (0.97) (1.20)
Outpatient hospital-quarters 90 210 90 210
ED = emergency department. Services defined using unique procedure codes per
admission.
Source: Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission inpatient discharge data July
2008 - June 2017, observation and outpatient discharge data July 2012 - June 2017.
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1.5. Empirical Strategy
I estimate the association between my measures of within-Maryland hospital exposure and
hospital visits, days, and services in the inpatient, observation, and outpatient settings.
I first estimate the following event study specification, allowing the effect of hospital h
exposure, dh to vary over time across my three measures of hospital exposure—revenue
exclusions, above median growth in predicted disease burden, and above median predicted
growth in inpatient service lines.
ln(yhyq) = αh + δy +
y=2017∑
y=2009
βy (dh × 1 (yeary)) + εhyq (1.5)
ln(yhyq) is the natural log of the outcome of interest for hospital h in quarter q of calendar
year y. dh is an indicator for whether the hospital is more exposed to the revenue target
and is interacted with a full set of calendar year fixed effects. Due to a limited sample size,
I am unable to estimate the event study using quarter fixed effects, and instead include
calendar year fixed effects δy. I include hospital fixed effects αh to account for time-invariant
heterogeneity by hospital. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at
the hospital level.
The βy coefficients are estimated relative to the year prior to the payment system change,
2013. For years prior to the payment system change, these coefficients can serve as tests
of the parallel trends assumption, which I expect not to hold a priori for two of my three
exposure measures. The two growth measures separate hospitals based on difference in
pre-intervention trends. The βy coefficients for years after the introduction of the GBR
measure the differential change from 2013 to year y in outcomes for more exposed hospitals
relative to the change from 2013 to year y for less exposed hospitals.
As will be shown in Section 1.6, the event study specifications confirm the existence of pre
intervention trends in outcomes. I run the following linear regression, allowing for differences
in the baseline trends by group of hospital exposure, for inpatient outcomes only. With six
30
quarters of pre policy data in the outpatient and observation settings, the estimate of a
linear time trend across the study sample would be determined mostly by the post period
trend (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). For each of the three measures of within-Maryland
hospital exposure, dh—hospitals without revenue exclusions, hospitals with above median
growth in predicted disease burden, and hospitals with above median predicted growth in
inpatient service lines, I estimate:
ln(yhyq) = αh + δy + γ1trendy + γ2trendy × dh + βposty × dh + εhyq (1.6)
Again, αh are hospital fixed effects, δt are year fixed effects, and standard errors are robust
to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the hospital level. trendy is a linear time trend
ranging from 1 to 9 in the inpatient regressions (1 for calendar year 2009 and 9 for calendar
year 2017). The coefficient γ1 measures the trend in outcomes for less exposed hospitals
over the entire study period, with the coefficient γ2 measuring the difference in trends
for more exposed hospitals. If the introduction of the total revenue constraint under the
GBR differentially affects hospitals without revenue exclusions, hospitals with above median
growth in predicted disease burden, or hospitals with above median predicted growth in
service lines, I would expect β to be negative. Again, noting the significant differences in
baseline trends, it is not possible to infer a casual relationship from these associations.
1.6. Results
In this section I provide estimation results of equation 1.5 for inpatient visits, inpatient
days, inpatient services, observation visits, observation services, outpatient emergency de-
partment (ED) visits, ED services, outpatient non-ED visits, and outpatient non-ED ser-
vices using three measures of within-Maryland hospital exposure to the GBR’s total revenue
constraint. I additionally present estimation results for equation 1.6 for inpatient measures
of volume.
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1.6.1. Inpatient volume
Figure 5 graphs the βy coefficients from the event-study specification presented in equation
1.5 for inpatient visits, inpatient days, and inpatient services per visit. I include year and
hospital fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the hospital level. All panels report 95%
confidence intervals around the βy coefficients. Graphs to the left present estimated event-
study coefficients splitting the sample of hospitals into those without and those with revenue
exclusions. There is clear evidence of differences in pre period trends in inpatient visits
using this measure of hospital exposure. Hospitals without revenue exclusions experienced
faster decline in inpatient visits than hospitals with revenue exclusions prior to the payment
system change. There are no significant differences in changes to inpatient days or inpatient
services between the two hospital groups before or after the payment system change. Though
not significant, inpatient services appear to have experienced faster decline in hospitals
without revenue exclusions than in hospitals with revenue exclusions prior to the GBR
implementation.
The center column of Figure 5 plots the estimated event study coefficients comparing in-
patient volume for hospitals with above median growth in predicted disease burden to
hospitals with below median growth. Again, as expected, there is evidence of differences in
pre intervention trends in inpatient admissions and what appears to be a continuation of
these trends following the GBR. Hospitals with above median growth in predicted disease
burden experienced slower decline in inpatient visits than did hospitals with below median
growth in predicted disease burden. There are no significant differences in inpatient days
between the two groups before or after the payment system change. Coefficient estimates
for the event study looking at inpatient services per visit are noisy, but close to zero across
all years.
Finally, graphs to the right present the βy coefficients from the event study specifica-
tion in equation 1.5 for inpatient volume splitting the sample of hospitals into those with
above/below median predicted growth in service lines. I find evidence that hospitals with
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above median predicted growth in service lines experienced slower decline in inpatient visits
prior to the GBR implementation. This differential trend appears to continue after the
2014 implementation. Again, there are no significant differences in changes to inpatient
days or inpatient services between the two hospital groups before or after the payment
system change.
Table 9 presents the results from equation 1.6, looking at hospital deviation from trends in
inpatient visits, days, and services after the payment system change. I find no evidence of
deviation from trends across all three measures of within-Maryland exposure for all inpatient
volume outcomes. Even when allowing for differences in pre intervention trends, there is
no association between the GBR and my measures of within-Maryland hospital exposure
to the revenue constraint.
Table 9: Relationship between Inpatient Volume and within-Maryland Hospital Exposure
ln(inpatient visits) ln(inpatient days) ln(inpatient services)
Rev. PDB Serv. Rev. PDB Serv. Rev. PDB Serv.
excl. growth growth excl. growth growth excl. growth growth
trend -0.016∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.018 -0.006 0.004
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
trend× dh -0.029∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.022∗∗ -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.019 0.019 -0.009
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020)
post× dh 0.017 -0.037 0.057 -0.012 0.016 -0.005 -0.030 -0.120 -0.054
(0.032) (0.041) (0.040) (0.024) (0.013) (0.013) (0.060) (0.096) (0.098)
Observations 1120 960 960 1120 960 960 1120 960 960
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.
Rev. excl. compares hospitals without revenue exclusions to hospitals with revenue exclusions.
PDB growth compares hospitals with above median growth in pre period predicted disease burden to hospitals with
below median growth, excluding hospitals with revenue exclusions.
Serv. growth compares hospitals with above median growth in pre period service lines to hospitals with below
median growth, excluding hospitals with revenue exclusions.
Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital level are reported in parentheses.
Source: Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC) inpatient discharge data, July 2009 - June
2017.
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Figure 5: Relationship between Inpatient Volume and within-Maryland Hospital
Exposure, Event-Studies
 GBR
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Es
tim
at
ed
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year
without/with revenue
exclusions
(a) ln(inpatient visits)
 GBR
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
Es
tim
at
ed
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year
above/below median
predicted disease burden
 GBR
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
Es
tim
at
ed
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year
above/below median
inpatient service line
 GBR
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
Es
tim
at
ed
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year
without/with revenue
exclusions
(b) ln(inpatient days)
 GBR
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
Es
tim
at
ed
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year
above/below median
predicted disease burden
 GBR
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
Es
tim
at
ed
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year
above/below median
inpatient service line
 GBR
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
Es
tim
at
ed
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year
without/with revenue
exclusions
(c) ln(inpatient services)
 GBR
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
Es
tim
at
ed
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year
above/below median
predicted disease burden
 GBR
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
Es
tim
at
ed
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year
above/below median
inpatient service line
Estimated using hospital and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the hospital level.
Source: Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC) inpatient discharge data, July 2009
- June 2017.
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1.6.2. Observation volume
Figure 6 presents event study coefficients across the three measures for hospital observation
volume. Without longer pre period data, it is not possible to evaluate pre intervention
trends, though I expect hospitals with above median growth-based exposure measures to
trend differently than below median hospitals. Changes to observation visits are imprecisely
estimated, as shown by the wide confidence intervals in the first row of the figure. There are
no statistically significant changes to volume of services provided in the observation setting
across all three measures.
Figure 6: Relationship between Observation Volume and within-Maryland Hospital
Exposure, Event-Studies
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Estimated using hospital and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the hospital level.
Source: Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC) observation discharge data, July 2012
- June 2017.
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1.6.3. Outpatient volume
Figure 7 presents event study coefficients across the three measures for hospital outpatient
ED volume. Without longer pre period data, it is not possible to rule out the existence of
differences in pre intervention trends. Here I discuss changes in volume relative to the 2013
baseline year. I find that ED visits grew slower at hospitals without revenue exclusions
relative to 2013 compared to hospitals with revenue exclusions, as shown by the downward
sloping coefficients in the top left panel of Figure 1.5. These changes are marginally sig-
nificant in 2016 and 2017. I find that ED services per visit significantly decreased more in
hospitals without revenue exclusions than in hospitals with revenue exclusions in the years
after the payment system change relative to 2013. Without a longer pre intervention period,
I cannot rule out that these changes are merely continuations of diverging pre period trends.
Looking at the center column of Figure 7, I find no statistically significant differences
in changes to ED visits or ED services between hospitals with above median growth in
predicted disease burden relative to hospitals with below median growth in predicted disease
burden. The event-study coefficient graphs presented in the right column of Figure 7 suggest
that ED visits in hospitals with above median predicted growth in service lines grew faster
than did visits in hospitals with below median growth in services lines after 2013. Again
without a longer pre period, I cannot rule out that these changes are merely continuations
of diverging pre period trends.
Finally, I look at non-ED outpatient volume in Figure 8. I find no significant differences in
changes to non-ED outpatient services between hospital groups across all three measures,
as shown in the bottom row of the figure. I find no significant differences in changes to non-
ED outpatient visits between hospital groups when using measures of growth in predicted
disease burden and predicted growth in service lines. I find that hospitals without revenue
exclusions experienced slower growth in outpatient visits relative to hospitals with revenue
exclusions. I am not able to determine whether these differences are continuations in pre
GBR trends.
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Figure 7: Relationship between Emergency Department Volume and within-Maryland
Hospital Exposure, Event-Studies
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Estimated using hospital and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the hospital level.
Source: Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC) observation discharge data, July 2012
- June 2017.
37
Figure 8: Relationship between Non-Emergency Department Outpatient Volume and
within-Maryland Hospital Exposure, Event-Studies
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Estimated using hospital and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the hospital level.
Source: Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC) observation discharge data, July 2012
- June 2017.
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1.7. Conclusion
This study is limited in a number of ways. First, given the short pre period in outpatient
and observation discharge data, I am unable to determine whether changes to ED volume
and outpatient non-ED volume diverge from pre intervention trends. Further, my study is
under powered, as evident in the wide confidence intervals in a number of the event study
figures. Though I explore three measures of within-Maryland exposure to the payment
system change and assume the existence of pre intervention trends, I find no evidence that
the GBR is associated with decreases in inpatient hospital volume.
This study could be extended in few ways. First, though my framework suggests that
hospitals will respond to the GBR by reducing “discretionary” volume, here I look at
overall hospital volume. Disentangling the volume response by type of hospital volume (e,
d, g(b)) could uncovered different effects. Second, revenue exclusions from the GBR apply
specifically to non-Maryland residents and certain inpatient and outpatient service lines.
Examining the association between revenue exclusions and changes in the specific service
lines or groups of patients to which they apply could uncover different effects.
I add to the growing literature that fails to identify a suitable comparison group for study-
ing the Maryland payment system change—once again highlighting the uniqueness of the
hospital payment environment. Maryland’s distinctive system makes both developing an
internally consistent estimate of policy effect and generalizing the state’s experience to other
markets difficult.
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CHAPTER 2 : The Economics of Care Regionalization: Evidence from
Philadelphia’s Time Critical Illness Destination Policies, with Guy
David
Approximately 795,000 people in the United States suffer a stroke each year, with over
80% suffering a stroke for the first time. Not only is stroke the fifth leading cause of death
in the United States, causing 140,000 deaths annually, it is also a leading cause of long
term disability (Benjamin et al., 2017; Heron, 2018). Myocardial infarction (MI)—a form of
coronary heart disease—afflicts approximately 580,000 people for the first time and reoccurs
in 210,000 people each year in the United States (Benjamin et al., 2017). Mortality from
MI reached nearly 115,000 in 2014. Similar to those surviving stroke, survivors of MI have
a higher chance of illness and death when compared to the general population (Benjamin
et al., 2017). Regionalization—a coordinated system of care that spans a defined geographic
area—is one way to potentially improve outcomes for these time critical illnesses (Fowler,
2015).
In the context of time critical emergencies such as acute stroke and ST-elevation myocardial
infarction (STEMI), regional systems of care have the potential to improve outcomes in at
least two ways. First, regional systems often incorporate destination policies requiring emer-
gency medical services (EMS) providers to transport patients to specified locations based on
the EMS providers’ impression of the illness. Bypassing the closest hospital for the appro-
priate facility may increase transportation time but reduce time from first medical contact
to diagnosis and treatment, thereby improving outcomes and reducing mortality (Fowler,
2015). Second, regional systems capitalize on the volume-outcome relationship—higher
hospital volume is associated with improved outcomes through static economies of scale or
learning-by-doing (Gaynor et al., 2005).
Extensive evaluations of acute stroke services centralization in the United Kingdom find
that regionalization reduces all-cause risk-adjusted mortality and hospital length of stay
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in the region, but that patients who continue to receive care in non-designated facilities
have worse outcomes following regionalization (Morris et al., 2014; Friebel et al., 2018;
Morris et al., 2019). Evaluations of STEMI regionalization focus on changes to time to
percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) and are limited by availability of pre-period data
and adequate comparison groups.
This paper focuses on regional systems of care for acute stroke and STEMI in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania and identifies the causal effect of regionalization by leveraging the differential
impact of such policies on areas of the city where the nearest hospital is not a designated
facility. Though we do not disentangle the effect of reduced time to appropriate treatment
from the volume-outcome effect, in a difference in differences framework we estimate the
effect of regionalization on the probability of admission to a non-designated facility, the
probability of any hospital inpatient transfer, hospital length of stay, discharge disposition,
total charges, the probability of receipt of stroke-specific interventions, and the probability of
receipt of STEMI-specific interventions. We find that acute stroke regionalization decreased
the probability of admission to a non-primary stroke center (PSC) by 5.0 percentage points
(11% of baseline) in the two years following regionalization; and that STEMI regionalization
decreased the probability of admission to a hospital incapable of percutaneous coronary
interventions (non PCI-capable) by 6.4 percentage points (87% of baseline) in the first year
of regionalization. We find that stroke regionalization increased the probability of inpatient
brain MRI by 7.1 percentage points (43%), but no evidence that stroke regionalization was
associated with changes in hospital inpatient transfers, hospital length of stay, hospital
discharge status, total charges, or probability of receiving other stroke-specific imaging or
interventions. These effects are concentrated in the ischemic stroke subtype. In addition to
moving admissions from non-designated facilities, STEMI regionalization weakly increased
the probability of undergoing percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) and
increased hospital charges.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 provides background on stroke
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and STEMI regionalization in Philadelphia. Section 2.2 summarizes the current state of
the literature. Section 2.3 describes our data set, defines our measures of exposure to
regionalization, outlines our outcomes of interest, and provides descriptive statistics. Section
2.4 presents our empirical strategy. Section 2.5 discusses our results. Section 2.6 concludes
and proposes directions for future work.
2.1. Policy Background
Philadelphia implemented a destination policy for acute stroke in October 2011; and or-
ganized a regional system for STEMI starting in July 2012 as part of the American Heart
Association Mission: Lifelife STEMI Accelerator demonstration project. In this section, we
provide background on Philadelphia’s regional systems of care for acute stroke and STEMI.
2.1.1. Acute Stroke Regionalization
Philadelphia’s stroke destination policy was implemented in October 2011, following policy
recommendations from expert panels. To address fragmentation in the emergency care
system, the Institute of Medicine recommended regionalized systems for stroke care in 2006
(Institute of Medicine, 2006). In 2007 an expert panel on EMS systems convened by the
American Heart Association and the American Stroke Association along with the Stroke
Council made similar recommendations. Building on their 2004 recommendations, the
expert panel called for pre-hospital providers, emergency physicians, and stroke experts to
develop system protocols for transportation of stroke patients to the nearest stroke center
(either primary stroke center or comprehensive stroke center) (Acker et al., 2007). The
Brain Attack Coalition recommended EMS providers transport stroke patients to the nearest
stroke center (Alberts et al., 2011). The American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP)
endorsed regionalization for time-critical illnesses, including stroke, in 2013 (ACEP, 2013).
Philadelphia was not the only region to take these policy recommendations to practice.
From 2010 to 2014, the number of states with stroke destination policies increased from
16 states (and 3 counties) to 24 states (Song and Saver, 2012; Report Card Task Force
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Members and ACEP Staff, 2014).
The Pennsylvania Department of Health, Bureau of Emergency Medical Services’ 2011
statewide protocols specified that acute stroke patients be transported to certified primary
stroke centers, potentially bypassing the nearest non-certified hospital (Bureau of Emer-
gency Medical Services, 2011a,b). This protocol update was announced March 1, 2011 to
be implemented by July 1, 2011 or at the time of provider education if earlier (Bureau of
Emergency Medical Services, 2011c).
Certified primary stroke centers (PSCs) differ from non-certified hospitals in a number of
ways. We select a few examples to highlight here. In terms of labor, PSCs are required to
have acute stroke teams available 24/7; must have a neurologist accessible 24/7 in person
or via telemedicine; and must have an emergency department (ED) physician perform the
initial assessment for patients presenting in the ED. In terms of capital, PSCs are required
to operate stroke units or designate beds for acute stroke patients; keep CT and labs (and
MRI if used) available 24/7 for diagnostic testing; and be capable of delivering IV throm-
bolytics. Finally, PSCs must adhere to the 2011 Brain Attack Coalition guidelines and
track performance on at least 8 core stroke measures (The Joint Commission, 2018b,c).
PSC hospital admission is associated with lower 30-day all-cause mortality and higher rates
of thrombolytic therapy administration in the ischemic stroke population (Xian et al., 2011).
Thrombolytic therapy, and specifically tissue plasminogen activator (tPA), is used in the
treatment of ischemic stroke to dissolve clots blocking blood flow to the brain. PSC ad-
mission is associated with lower 7-day and lower 30-day mortality for Medicare patients
suffering from ischemic or hemorrhagic stroke (Bekelis et al., 2016).1
We identify PSCs in Philadelphia using The Joint Commission’s PSC certification in part-
nership with the American Heart Association (AHA) and American Stroke Association
1Both Xian et al. (2011) and Bekelis et al. (2016) estimate the causal effects of stroke center admission
on mortality using differential distance (or travel time) to the nearest PSC as an instrument for PSC
admission—as observed hospital choice is not random but correlated with both mortality and unobserved
patient characteristics (e.g., severity of stroke).
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(ASA).2 We use the Joint Commission’s Quality Check tool to classify Philadelphia area
hospitals as PSCs or non-PSCs at the start of the destination policy (The Joint Commission,
2018a). We crosscheck this classification with a list of Philadelphia hospitals that receive
stroke patients in 2010 and 2011 according to the PFD (Philadelphia Regional EMS, 2010,
2011).3 The PFD has provided emergency medical services for the City of Philadelphia
since 1974, meaning that all emergency 911 transits to hospitals follow these protocols
(Butkovitz, 2011). Table 10 shows PSC certification dates for Philadelphia area hospitals
and flags whether the facility received stroke patients from the PFD in 2010 and 2011.
With implementation of the destination policy, the number of Philadelphia area hospitals
receiving acute stroke patients decreased from 20 to 12; and the number of hospitals within
Philadelphia limits decreased from 17 to 9.
2.1.2. ST-Elevation Myocardial Infarction Regionalization
Philadelphia joined fifteen other regions across the country in the American Heart Associa-
tion Regional Systems of Care Demonstration Project: Mission: Lifelife STEMI Accelerator
in July 2012. The goals of Mission: Lifeline were to accelerate regional STEMI system de-
velopment, facilitate care coordination, and improve clinical outcomes for STEMI patients
(Bagai et al., 2014). The demonstration built on the experience of regional STEMI systems
in North Carolina where coordination between regional PCI hospitals, non-PCI hospitals,
and EMS contributed to decreases in time to reperfusion.4
Updates to STEMI treatment guidelines in 2009 by the American College of Cardiology
Foundation (ACCF) and the AHA recommended that each community develop a STEMI
2As of 2019, the Joint Commission offers four levels of stroke certification: Acute Stroke Ready Hospital
(ASRH), Primary Stroke Center (PSC), Thrombectomy-Capable Stroke Center (TSC), and Comprehensive
Stroke Center (CSC).
3The Philadelphia Patient Hospital Receiving List for 2013 is available on the City of Philadelphia’s
Regional EMS resource page: http://www.phila.gov/regionalems/Resources/Pages/default.aspx
4Reperfusion therapies restore blood flow and limit infarct (dead tissue) size. Reperfusion therapies
include primary PCI and fibrinolytic therapy (Gibson et al., 2018). Primary PCI is defined by Keeley and
Hillis (2007) as “urgent balloon angioplasty (with or without stenting) without the previous administration
of fibrinolytic therapy [...] to open the infarct-related artery during an acute myocardial infarction with
ST-segment elevation.”
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Table 10: Philadelphia Area Hospitals, Primary Stroke Center Certification and
Percutaneous Coronary Intervention (PCI) Capability
Stroke STEMI
Joint Commission
Hospital PSC Certification PFD 2010 PFD 2011 PFD 2013
Albert Einstein Medical Center July 22, 2009 Y Y Y
Aria Health - Frankford January 11, 2013 Y N N
Aria Health - Torresdale January 11, 2013 Y N Y
Chestnut Hill September 20, 2011 Y Y N
Episcopal N/A Y N N
Hahnemann April 14, 2010 Y Y Y
Holy Redeemer June 22, 2011 Y Y Y
Hosp of the Univ of PA June 10, 2010 Y Y Y
Jeanes January 14, 2010 Y Y Y
Lankenau September 23, 2009 Y Y Y
Mercy Fitzgerald April 24, 2009 Y Y Y
Mercy Hosp of Phila April 24, 2009 Y Y N
Methodist N/A Y N N
Nazareth September 14, 2010 Y Y Y
Pennsylvania July 14, 2012 Y N Y
Presbyterian July 27, 2012 Y N Y
Roxborough July 9, 2014 Y N N
St. Joseph’s N/A Y N N
Temple September 4, 2011 Y Y Y
Thomas Jefferson July 31, 2009 Y Y Y
PSC = Primary Stroke Center; PCI = Percutaneous Coronary Intervention; STEMI = ST
Elevation Myocardial Infarction.
Source: Joint Commission’s Quality Check tool (The Joint Commission, 2018a). Philadelphia
Regional Emergency Medical Services (EMS) hospital receiving lists 2010, 2011, and 2013
(Philadelphia Regional EMS, 2010, 2011, 2013).
system of care including 1) ongoing meetings between EMS, PCI-capable hospitals, and
non-capable hospitals, 2) prehospital identification of STEMI and activation of the STEMI
system, 3) destination protocols for PCI-capable hospitals, and 4) transfer protocols for
patients who arrive at non-capable hospitals (Kushner et al., 2009). Based on a 2008-2010
survey by Jollis et al. (2012), we know that of the 381 surveyed STEMI systems of care across
the United States, 61% had destination policies in place, voluntarily or through legislation,
allowing for bypass of the nearest hospital in favor of the closest PCI-capable hospital for
patients diagnosed with STEMI in a pre-hospital setting. For the purposes of the survey,
a STEMI system was defined as a group of at least one PCI-capable hospital and at least
one EMS agency within a geographic region focused on reperfusion therapy. In addition
to detailing STEMI system processes, analysis of the survey found hospital competition
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and EMS transport to be the most commonly reported challenges in implementing regional
systems of care.
Over the course of the Mission: Lifeline demonstration, the percent of patients meeting
guideline recommendations for reperfusion (within 90 minutes of first medical contact for
patients presenting at PCI-capable hospitals and within 120 minutes for patients present-
ing at non-capable hospitals) increased for participating regions relative to baseline rates
(Jollis et al., 2016). Hospitals in participating regions were more likely to allow pre-hospital
catheterization laboratory activation for patients transported by EMS, single call transfers
for patients presenting at non-capable hospitals, emergency department bypass for patients
transported by EMS, and emergency department bypass for patients transferred from non-
capable hospitals after enrolling in the demonstration (Fordyce et al., 2017). Patients
treated at hospitals implementing these procedures had shorter times from first medical
contact to reperfusion, but did not differ in the rate of in-hospital morality (Fordyce et al.,
2017). Studies performed by the the Mission: Lifeline research and implementation team,
such as Jollis et al. (2016) and Fordyce et al. (2017) are limited by the extent of pre-
demonstration data (single quarter) and adequate comparison groups.
We identify PCI-capable hospitals in Philadelphia using the PFD’s list of hospitals that
receive STEMI patients in 2013 as shown in Table 10 (Philadelphia Regional EMS, 2013).
STEMI regionalization decreased the number of acute care hospitals within Philadelphia
receiving STEMI patients from 17 to 10. In our analyses, we use the first quarter of 2013 as
the first quarter of destination policy treatment, although efforts to transport patients to
PCI-capable hospitals likely began with enrollment in the Mission: Lifeline demonstration.
Studies such as Green et al. (2018) similarly use the start of 2013 to study STEMI desti-
nation policies in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania statewide Advanced Life Support (ALS) and
Basic Life Support (BLS) EMS protocols were updated in 2015 directing EMS providers
to transport patients with ECG confirmed STEMI to a STEMI-receiving center—either a
Mission: Lifeline center or a Chest Pain Center with PCI accredited by the Society of
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Cardiovascular Patient Care, or a facility designated by regional EMS to be PCI-capable
Bureau of Emergency Medical Services (2015a,b).
As described in Section 2.3, we leverage the differential impact of these destination policies
on Philadelphia residents in areas where the nearest hospital was not certified as a PSC or
was not PCI-capable to study the effect of regional systems of care on short term outcomes.
2.2. Existing Literature
Stroke regionalization in the United Kingdom has been studied extensively. London in
July 2010 and Greater Manchester in April 2010 reconfigured acute stroke care such that
suspected stroke patients were transported to designated stroke facilities instead of the
nearest emergency department (Fulop et al., 2013; Morris et al., 2014). This reduced the
number of hospitals receiving stroke patients from 30 to 8 in London and from 10 to 3 in
Greater Manchester (Fulop et al., 2013; Morris et al., 2014).
Morris et al. (2014) use a difference-in-differences framework to study the effect of stroke
regionalization on risk-adjusted mortality and risk-adjusted length of stay. Using hospital
episode and mortality data from January 2008 to March 2012, the authors compare changes
in their outcomes of interest before and after the reorganization in London and Greater
Manchester to changes in the unaffected regions of England. They find significant decreases
in 3-day, 30-day, and 90-day mortality and hospital length of stay in London (by 1.4 days);
and significant decreases in hospital length of stay in Greater Manchester (by 2.0 days).
Ramsay et al. (2015) attempt to explain the decrease in mortality found in London but not
Greater Manchester by focusing on changes in receipt of clinical interventions. The authors
do not identify the causal impact of regionalization, but suggest that London patients
were more likely to receive all clinical interventions while Greater Manchester patients were
more likely to receive brain scans but less likely to be admitted to a stroke unit, receive
physiotherapy, and receive swallowing assessments.
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Morris et al. (2019) extend Morris et al. (2014) and Ramsay et al. (2015) by incorporating
mortality and length of stay data through March 2016, studying a modification to the
Greater Manchester centralization that occurred by April 2015, and studying trends in
clinical interventions through March 2016. They find that reductions in mortality and
length of stay in London have been sustained since the 2010 centralization; risk-adjusted
90-day mortality significantly decreased at stroke centers in Greater Manchester (compared
to the rest of England) but not for Greater Manchester overall; risk-adjusted hospital length
of stay decreased in Greater Manchester compared to changes in the rest of England.
Friebel et al. (2018) separately identify the effects of stroke centralization in London on
patients who are treated at designated hospitals and those who remain treated at non-
designated hospitals. They find that regionalization increased rates of thrombolysis treat-
ment and decreased the percent of patients with aspiration pneumonia for patients treated
at designated facilities. They find that regionalization worsened outcomes for patients who
were treated at non-designated facilities following regionalization. Specifically, they find
regionalization to have caused lower rates of brain scans, higher death at seven days, higher
death at 30 days, lower rates of thrombolysis treatment, and higher readmissions (Friebel
et al., 2018).
Counties in California and New York, among others, enacted destination policies for acute
stroke patients in the first few years of the 2000s. Gropen et al. (2006) study an EMS desti-
nation policy implemented in May 2003 for acute stroke patients in Brooklyn and Queens,
New York, while Sanossian et al. (2015) focus on a destination policy in Los Angeles County
implemented in November 2009. Both studies rely on time series difference methodologies.
Gropen et al. (2006) pull inpatient records with an admitting diagnosis of stroke during a
baseline period (March 1, 2002 through May 31, 2002) and a re-measurement period (Au-
gust 1, 2003 through October 31, 2003) to compare utilization at 14 hospitals designated
as stroke centers by the New York State Department of Health prior to implementation
of the destination policy and 18 hospitals not designated. By comparing designated and
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non-designated hospitals in the baseline period and again in the re-measurement period, the
authors find that the hospitals differ in measurable ways, but they do not identify whether
those differences changed following the destination policy.5 Sanossian et al. (2015) study
whether access to approved stroke centers (ASCs)—certified PSCs that signed agreements
with Los Angeles EMS to follow policies and share data—and receipt of tPA therapy in-
creased after the implementation of a destination policy. Using a simple difference method-
ology with one year pre-policy and one year post-policy, the authors find that the percent
of patients transported to ASCs increased but found no difference in receipt of tPA therapy
or transportation time from scene to emergency department (Sanossian et al., 2015).
Prabhakaran et al. (2013) study rates of rt-PA use in Chicago at 10 PSCs before and after
a regional policy to route stroke patients to PSCs started on March 1, 2011. The authors
found increase in rate of intravenous tPA administration in the 6 months following the
policy implementation vs. the 6 months prior to the policy start date. The authors do
not consider treatment for patients routed to non-PSCs and cannot identify patients who
bypass nearest hospital for a PSC.
Hastrup et al. (2018) study the effects of stroke centralization on length of stay, hospital bed
days over the next year, quality of acute stroke care, hospital readmissions, and mortality in
the Central Denmark Region (CDR). Centralization in the CDR required all stroke patients
to be admitted to one of two acute stroke units, where previously only candidates for revas-
cularization therapy would be admitted to these units. They compare changes in outcomes
in the CDR to changes in the rest of Denmark in a difference-in-differences approach using
12 months prior to implementation as the before period (May 2011 - April 2012) and 12
months after implementation as the after period (May 2013-April 2014), adjusting for ad-
mission characteristics including stroke severity and stroke subtype (improvement on prior
lit without stroke severity). They find centralization to be associated with a decrease in the
5Designated hospitals had lower median door to CT performed time in the baseline period but not the
re-measurement period; and higher percentage of patients received tPA therapy and higher percentage of ED
diagnosed cases admitted to stroke unit in the baseline and re-measurement periods (Gropen et al., 2006).
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median length of stay, an increase in the percent of stroke events treated as outpatients,
but no change to total all-cause bed days or length of stay including rehabilitation. No
significant changes in the quality of acute stroke care, hospital readmissions, or mortality
were found relative to changes in the rest of Denmark.
As mentioned in Section 2.1.2, evidence on the causal impact of STEMI regionalization
on hospital utilization and outcomes is limited. The Mission: Lifeline evaluations focus
on time to reperfusion, mortality, and hospital processes Jollis et al. (2016); Fordyce et al.
(2017), and are limited to time-series differences. Green et al. (2018) compare six states,
including Pennsylvania, that reported statewide STEMI destination policies to Kupas et al.
(2015) to six comparison states without destination policies. Comparing rates of reperfusion
at 90 and 120 minutes from first medical contact and overall receipt of reperfusion therapy
in treated states to rates in untreated states, Green et al. (2018) find that STEMI patients
living in states with destination policies were more likely to receive reperfusion therapy
within guideline recommended timing than patients living in states without destination
policies.
In this paper, we discuss regional systems of care as they relate to time critical illnesses;
however, regionalization can apply to any condition or any set of services. Ho et al. (2007)
consider the volume-outcome relationship and the potential effects of regionalization on con-
sumer surplus using the market for the Whipple procedure for pancreatic cancer. Although
regionalization for complex surgical procedures may increase consumer surplus by improv-
ing outcomes, reduced hospital competition may increase prices thereby reducing consumer
surplus (Ho et al., 2007). The overall effect of regionalization on consumer surplus depends
on relative sizes of these effects. Ho et al. (2012) look at the relationship between hospital
volume and mortality and costs for pancreatic cancer surgery and colon cancer surgery,
while also considering the effect that reduced hospital competition has on mortality, costs,
and prices to study the welfare implications of regionalization. The authors conclude that
regionalization for pancreatic cancer improves welfare, but finds less evidence to support
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the same welfare-improving claim for colon cancer surgery (Ho et al., 2012). Bendzsak et al.
(2017) describe regionalization for lung cancer surgery in Ontario, Canada while Nelen et al.
(2017) describe regionalization for gastric cancer surgery in the Netherlands.
2.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use hospital inpatient discharge data for Philadelphia obtained from the Pennsylvania
Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) for calendar years 2008 through 2013 to
estimate the impact of regional systems of care on inpatient utilization and short term
outcomes. The data contain patient demographics, facility characteristics, diagnosis and
procedure codes, and charges for facilities located in Philadelphia (PHC4 region 9). In
this section we describe our sample inclusion criteria, define our measures of exposure, and
define our outcomes of interest.
2.3.1. Sample definitions
Of the two million inpatient admissions over our study period, we make several sample
exclusions as depicted in Figure 9. We exclude admissions to specialty hospitals as these
facilities should not receive patients suffering time critical illnesses before or after the re-
gionalization policies.6 As our measure of exposure to regionalization depends on patient
residence, we exclude admissions with invalid or missing zip codes and admissions for pa-
tients who reside outside of Philadelphia. We exclude admissions for patients under the age
of 18 years as well as pregnancy and childbirth admissions. Incidences of stroke and STEMI
in the under age 18 population are low (Fullerton et al., 2003; Mahle et al., 2007). Further,
pregnancy and childbirth related admissions differ from stroke and STEMI admissions in
measurable ways—age, sex, comorbidities, and priority of admission—and likely differ in
unmeasurable ways that influence hospital choice and outcomes. We exclude admissions
with invalid or missing outcomes of interest; and finally, we keep only admissions recorded
6We also exclude admissions to Temple East/Northeastern Hospital that transitioned to ambulatory
non-emergency services only in 2009.
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as being of emergency or urgent priority to remove scheduled admissions.7
Of the remaining 829,176 admissions, 5.3% involve at least one inpatient transfer. We are
able to match 8,972 (20.6%) of these admissions using information available in the PHC4
data, such as masked patient identifiers, discharge quarter, admission and discharge day of
week, and admission and discharge hour of day. We are unable to match the remaining
admissions due to a combination of data limitations, including missing patient identifiers,
restricted admission and discharge date identifiers, transfers to or from hospitals outside
Philadelphia, and transfers that occurred before 2008 or after 2013. In our analyses we treat
hospitalizations with matched transfers as single events, but do not exclude unmatched
transfers.
As the regional systems of care apply only to patients suspected of having the condi-
tions of interest, we divide the remaining 824,679 events by admitting diagnosis cate-
gories—cerebrovascular disease [International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision,
Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) with first three digits 430-438], acute myocardial infarc-
tion (AMI) (ICD-9-CM 410.xx), and all other admitting diagnoses. As admitting diagnosis
better fits with the spirit of destination policies, which rely on EMS providers’ impression of
the patient’s condition at time of transport, we require admissions in the stroke group have
an admitting diagnosis of any cerebrovascular disease and admissions in the STEMI group
have an admitting diagnosis of AMI (STEMI or non-STEMI) of any episode of care (initial,
subsequent, or unspecified). For events that contain more than one hospital admission, we
use admitting diagnosis on the first observed admission in our data.
The stroke group consists of 15,053 events with admitting diagnosis of any cerebrovascular
disease and primary diagnosis of stroke including transient ischemic attack (TIA) as defined
by the AHA and ASA in Sacco et al. (2013). Primary stroke diagnosis consists of central
nervous system (CNS) infarction (primary diagnosis of ICD-9-CM 433.x1, 434.x1, 366.1,
7Facilities do not uniformly report emergency versus urgent priority in the PHC4 data. We include both
emergency and urgent admissions. We are unable to identify patients admitted through the emergency
department.
52
F
ig
u
re
9
:
P
h
il
a
d
el
p
h
ia
In
p
at
ie
n
t
H
os
p
it
al
A
d
m
is
si
on
s,
S
tr
ok
e
an
d
S
T
E
M
I
S
am
p
le
C
re
at
io
n
 
2,
06
8,
23
0 
in
pa
ti
en
t a
dm
is
si
on
s,
 P
H
C
4 
re
gi
on
 9
, 2
00
8-
20
13
C
er
eb
ro
va
sc
ul
ar
 d
is
ea
se
 a
dm
it
ti
ng
 
di
ag
no
si
s
21
,6
60
 e
ve
nt
s
(2
1,
80
8 
ad
m
is
si
on
s)
St
ro
ke
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 T
IA
 p
ri
m
ar
y 
di
ag
no
si
s
15
,0
53
 st
ro
ke
 e
ve
nt
s
N
on
-s
tr
ok
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
di
ag
no
si
s
66
07
 u
nt
re
at
ed
 e
ve
nt
s
A
M
I a
dm
it
ti
ng
 d
ia
gn
os
is
, a
ny
 e
pi
so
de
6,
05
7 
ev
en
ts
(6
,1
40
 a
dm
is
si
on
s)
A
M
I p
ri
m
ar
y 
di
ag
no
si
s 
in
it
ia
l e
pi
so
de
 o
f c
ar
e
5,
35
4 
A
M
I e
ve
nt
s
ST
EM
I p
ri
m
ar
y 
di
ag
no
si
s
1,
62
0 
ST
EM
I e
ve
nt
s
N
ST
EM
I p
ri
m
ar
y 
di
ag
no
si
s
3,
73
4 
N
ST
EM
I e
ve
nt
s
N
on
-A
M
I p
ri
m
ar
y 
di
ag
no
si
s o
r 
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 o
r u
ns
pe
ci
fi
ed
 e
pi
so
de
 o
f 
ca
re
70
3 
un
tr
ea
te
d 
ev
en
ts
A
ll
 o
th
er
 a
dm
it
ti
ng
 d
ia
gn
os
es
79
6,
96
2 
ev
en
ts
(8
01
,2
28
 a
dm
is
si
on
s)
U
pp
er
 G
I h
em
or
rh
ag
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
di
ag
no
si
s
6,
71
4 
un
tr
ea
te
d 
ev
en
ts
A
ll
 o
th
er
 p
ri
m
ar
y 
di
ag
no
se
s
79
0,
24
8 
un
tr
ea
te
d 
ev
en
ts
1,
23
9,
05
4 
ad
m
is
si
on
s 
ex
cl
ud
ed
37
2,
55
7 
ad
m
itt
ed
 to
 sp
ec
ia
lty
 o
r e
xc
lu
de
d 
ho
sp
ita
l 
2,
63
9 
m
is
si
ng
 o
r i
nv
al
id
 z
ip
 c
od
e 
48
7,
88
6 
re
si
de
 o
ut
si
de
 P
hi
la
de
lp
hi
a
11
3,
12
1 
ag
e 
le
ss
 th
an
 1
8 
ye
ar
s 
or
 m
is
si
ng
11
4,
53
4 
pr
eg
na
nc
y,
 c
hi
ld
bi
rt
h,
 p
ue
rp
er
iu
m
25
,5
76
 in
va
lid
 o
r m
is
si
ng
 o
ut
co
m
e 
of
 in
te
re
st
12
2,
74
1 
no
n-
em
er
ge
nc
y 
no
n-
ur
ge
nt
 p
rio
rit
y
43
,6
32
 a
dm
is
si
on
s 
in
vo
lv
e 
in
pa
ti
en
t 
tr
an
sf
er
8,
97
2 
m
at
ch
ed
 a
dm
is
si
on
s
34
,6
60
 u
nm
at
ch
ed
 a
dm
is
si
on
s
P
H
C
4
=
P
en
n
sy
lv
a
n
ia
H
ea
lt
h
C
a
re
C
o
st
C
o
n
ta
in
m
en
t
C
o
u
n
ci
l;
A
M
I
=
A
cu
te
M
y
o
ca
rd
ia
l
In
fa
rc
ti
o
n
;
T
IA
=
T
ra
n
si
en
t
Is
ch
em
ic
A
tt
a
ck
;
S
T
E
M
I
=
S
T
el
ev
a
ti
o
n
m
y
o
ca
rd
ia
l
in
fa
rc
ti
o
n
;
N
S
T
E
M
I
=
n
o
n
-S
T
E
M
I;
G
I
=
G
a
st
ro
in
te
st
in
a
l.
53
362.31, or 362.32), CNS hemorrhage (primary diagnosis of ICD-9-CM 430 or 431), or TIA
(primary diagnosis of ICD-9-CM 435.x or 362.34) (Sacco et al., 2013).8 The left panel of
Figure 10 plots the volume of treated stroke events over our study period by stroke type.
A vertical line marks the start of Philadelphia’s stroke destination policy in the fourth
quarter of 2011. Again, we refer to Sacco et al. (2013) for definitions of stroke type. The
majority of strokes are ischemic in nature throughout our study period. Volume by type
of stroke appears steady mid-2009 through the start of 2012, after which there appears to
be a rise in the number of hospital events for ischemic stroke and a decline in the number
of hospital events for transient ischemic attacks (TIA). Both ischemic strokes and TIAs
are caused by a blockage of blood flow to the brain, often a blood clot (American Heart
Association/American Stroke Association, 2018). In the case of TIAs, these blockages are
temporary, though often warnings of future ischemic strokes. Because pre-hospital providers
cannot distinguish between types of stroke without imaging (discussed in Section 2.3.3), the
acute stroke destination policy applies uniformly across stroke subtypes.
Figure 10: Volume of Inpatient Hospital Events, by Condition
 Stroke regionalization
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TIA = transient ischemic attack; ICH = intracerebral hemorrhage; SAH = subarachnoid hem-
orrhage; AMI = acute myocardial infarction; STEMI = ST-elevation myocardial infarction;
NSTEMI = non-STEMI
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data
for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013
8We follow the expert definition of stroke including TIA outlined in Sacco et al. (2013), but the definition
of stroke hospitalization varies widely in the literature. For example, Gropen et al. (2006) use admitting
diagnoses of 430, 431, 432.9, 433.x1, 434.x1, or 436; Xian et al. (2011) use primary diagnoses 433.x1, 434.x1,
or 436; and Bekelis et al. (2016) use primary diagnoses 430.xx, 431.xx, 434.xx, or 434.xx.
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We identify 5,354 events with admitting diagnosis of AMI and primary diagnosis of AMI
initial episode (ICD-9-CM 410.x1).9 Thirty percent of these events have a primary diagnosis
of STEMI, while the remaining 70% have primary diagnosis of non-ST elevation myocar-
dial infarction (NSTEMI). STEMI is distinguished from NSTEMI using electrocardiogram
(ECG), which can be performed by ALS EMS providers (Simmons and Alpert, 2018). The
right panel of Figure 10 shows the volume of STEMI events and untreated NSTEMI events
over our study period. A shaded vertical panel between July 2012 and January 2013 marks
Philadelphia’s enrollment in the Mission: Lifeline demonstration project. While STEMI
volume appears flat in the quarters before and after regionalization, NSTEMI volume trends
upward starting with the first quarter of 2012. In addition to examining the impact of
STEMI regionalization on short term outcomes for STEMI patients, we test for spillovers
in the NSTEMI population.
In later work, we will incorporate our untreated sample of hospital events in a triple dif-
ference. The untreated sample consists of 796,962 hospital events unrelated to stroke or
AMI, 6,607 events admitted with cerebrovascular disease but without a primary diagnosis of
stroke, and 703 events with an admitting diagnosis of AMI but without a primary diagnosis
of STEMI or NSTEMI initial episode of care. We further classify a subset of the untreated
events as upper gastrointestinal hemorrhage (UGIH) events. Similar to stroke and AMI,
acute gastrointestinal hemorrhage can be life threatening; however, no regional system of
care for gastrointestinal hemorrhage exists in Philadelphia (Barkun et al., 2010). In their
study of primary stroke center outcomes, Xian et al. (2011) similarly use admissions for
gastrointestinal hemorrhage as part of falsification tests.
2.3.2. Exposure by Geography
The development of regional systems of care differentially affects areas where the nearest
acute care facility is not designated as the regional center of care. We leverage this dif-
9Patients with subsequent episodes of AMI may return to the hospital that treated their first episode,
not the nearest hospital or PCI-capable hospital. We will include these episodes in our untreated group in
later work.
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ferential exposure by geography to classify Philadelphia zip codes as treated or untreated
by the stroke and STEMI regionalization. Treated zip codes are those most impacted by
the destination policy—areas where the nearest hospital is not a PSC/PCI-capable facility.
EMS crews transporting stroke and STEMI incidents in these areas presumably bypass
the nearest hospital to comply with destination policies, trading off a small increase in
transportation time for improved access to appropriate treatment at the destination.
We classify zip codes as treated by the stroke destination policy if differential distance from
the zip code to a PSC is greater than zero. Similarly, we classify zip codes as treated by
the STEMI destination policy if differential distance from the zip code to a PCI-capable
facility is greater than zero. Differential distance is a widely used predictor of hospital
choice as it explains variation in observed hospital choice, but is unlikely to be correlated
with unobserved confounders (e.g., stroke severity).10
Table 11 compares pre-regionalization characteristics for stroke patients in treated zip codes
to those for stroke patients in untreated zip codes. Stroke patients admitted from treated
zip codes are older than stroke patients admitted from untreated zip codes, by 2.43 years, in
the years prior to regionalization. The racial composition of admissions differs significantly
in treated and untreated zip codes prior to treatment—with stroke patients from treated
zip codes more likely to be white or Asian, and less likely to be black or another race. The
proportions of uninsured and Medicaid patients are lower in treated zip codes, while the pro-
portion of Medicare patients is higher—corresponding with the higher average age of stroke
patients from treated zip codes. We use Charlson comorbidities to compare health status.
These comorbidity indicators are defined following Quan et al. (2005) using primary diag-
noses and the first eight secondary diagnoses.11 Stroke admissions from treated zip codes
10Differential distance was formally defined in(McClellan et al., 1994) and Newhouse and McClellan (1998)
as the additional distance beyond the distance to the nearest hospital to reach a hospital with the charac-
teristic of interest.
11The number of reported secondary diagnoses expanded from 8 to 17 in January 2011. Using the expanded
set of diagnoses in the post period, when not available for the majority of the pre period would artificially
make the post period group appear sicker than the treatment period group. This would pose an issue for
identification if diagnosis field expansion differentially affected treatment and untreated diagnosis groups or
zip codes.
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have lower rates congestive heart failure (CHF), uncomplicated diabetes, and renal disease;
while they are more likely to have myocardial infarction, diabetes with complications, and
metastatic solid tumors. Although we compare rates of pre-regionalization Charlson co-
morbidities, we do not include these measures as admission-level controls in our empirical
analysis. Because these measures are defined using diagnoses from the same hospital event
as our event of interest, they may represent complications of treatment. Including these
comorbidities (or complications) in our estimation would prevent us from obtaining a con-
sistent estimate.12 These differences only pose an issue for identification of the causal effect
if the differences are trending differently over time.
Table 12 compares pre-regionalization characteristics for STEMI patients in treated zip
codes to those for STEMI patients in untreated zip codes. STEMI patients from treated zip
codes and STEMI patients from untreated zip codes are generally similar across a number of
characteristics in the years prior to regionalization, with a few exceptions. STEMI patients
from treated zip codes are less likely to be white and more likely to be black; and less likely
to be of Hispanic or Latino origin/descent. STEMI patients from treated zip codes are less
likely to have commercial insurance than STEMI patients from untreated zip codes. In
Table 31, we report pre-period characteristics for untreated NSTEMI patients coming from
treated and untreated zip codes.
12Present on admission indicators are available in the PHC4 data starting with the first quarter of 2011.
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Table 11: Admission Characteristics by Geography (differential distance PSC >0), Pre
Stroke Regionalization Policy, January 2008 - September 2011
Treated Zip Untreated Zip
Admission Characteristics
Age, in years 69.58 (14.62) 67.15 (15.17) ***
Sex (%)
Female 57.67 56.76
Male 42.33 43.24
Race (%)
White 59.35 33.72 ***
Black 31.26 54.38 ***
Asian 2.72 1.60 ***
Other race 6.68 10.30 ***
Hispanic/Latino origin/descent (%) 2.97 6.15 ***
Payer (%)
Uninsured 0.54 1.86 ***
Medicare 64.00 59.00 ***
Medicaid 17.41 20.96 ***
Blue Cross 11.97 11.46
Commercial 5.39 5.48
Government 0.45 0.47
Comorbidities (%)
Myocardial infarction 7.52 6.12 **
Congestive heart failure 10.93 13.39 ***
Peripheral vascular disease 6.13 5.28
Cerebrovascular disease 99.95 99.96
Dementia 2.87 2.95
Chronic pulmonary disease 12.51 12.95
Rheumatic disease 1.38 1.67
Peptic ulcer disease 0.20 0.43
Mild liver disease 1.19 1.68
Diabetes without complications 23.99 28.77 ***
Diabetes with complications 3.96 3.10 *
Hemiplegia or paraplegia 23.74 24.59
Renal disease 7.86 9.72 **
Malignancy, except skin 3.21 3.07
Moderate or severe liver disease 0.10 0.20
Metastatic solid tumor 1.48 0.96 **
AIDS/HIV 0.20 0.39
Exposure
Zip exposure group PFD 1 (%) 73.84 25.67
Zip exposure group PFD 2 (%) 66.67 22.25
Zip exposure group d.distance PSC (%) 100.00 0.00
Differential distance PSC, in miles 1.55 (0.96) 0.00 (0.00)
N 2,022 7,429
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10.
PFD = Philadelphia Fire Department; PSC = primary stroke center.
All characteristics, except for comborbidities, are defined using the first
observed stay for a hospitalization, unless the characeristic is missing.
Comorbidities are defined using the primary diagnoses from each observed
stay of the hospitalization and secondary diagnoses in order of observed stay,
up to nine diagnoses. The percent of stroke hospitalizations with
cerebrovascular disease comorbidity may be less than 100%, as patients with
acute infarction of the spinal cord or retinal vascular occlusions are included
in the stroke sample.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4)
inpatient discharge data for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 through September
2011.
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Table 12: Admission Characteristics by Geography (differential distance PCI >0), Pre
STEMI Regionalization Policy, January 2008 - December 2012
Treated Zip Untreated Zip
Admission Characteristics
Age, in years 63.27 (14.07) 62.67 (14.87)
Sex (%)
Female 41.18 37.01
Male 58.82 62.99
Race (%)
White 36.76 52.96 ***
Black 50.29 30.49 ***
Asian 1.47 2.81
Other race 11.47 13.74
Hispanic/Latino origin/descent (%) 2.35 6.12 ***
Payer (%)
Uninsured 1.47 1.81
Medicare 46.47 45.24
Medicaid 20.59 23.17
Blue Cross 22.35 18.96
Commercial 6.18 9.23 *
Government 2.65 1.50
Comorbidities (%)
Myocardial infarction 100.00 100.00
Congestive heart failure 23.82 26.58
Peripheral vascular disease 5.00 4.61
Cerebrovascular disease 3.82 2.81
Dementia 0.29 1.30
Chronic pulmonary disease 12.35 15.85
Rheumatic disease 2.06 1.00
Peptic ulcer disease 1.18 0.40
Mild liver disease 2.94 4.01
Diabetes without complications 25.59 26.28
Diabetes with complications 1.76 1.71
Hemiplegia or paraplegia 0.88 0.30
Renal disease 10.59 9.03
Malignancy, except skin 1.76 2.11
Moderate or severe liver disease 0.00 0.10
Metastatic solid tumor 0.59 0.50
AIDS/HIV 0.00 0.60
Exposure (%)
Zip exposure group d.distance PCI 100.00 0.00
Differential distance PCI, in miles 1.73 (1.33) 0.00 (0.00)
N 340 997
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10.
PCI = percutaneous coronary intervention; STEMI = ST-elevation
myocardial infarction.
All characteristics, except for comborbidities, are defined using the first
observed stay for a hospitalization, unless the characeristic is missing.
Comorbidities are defined using the primary diagnoses from each observed
stay of the hospitalization and secondary diagnoses in order of observed stay,
up to nine diagnoses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4)
inpatient discharge data for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 through December
2012.
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2.3.3. Outcomes
First, we test whether the destination policies achieve their stated goal of routing eligible
patients to regional centers of care. Our outcomes of interest are probability of admission to
a non-PSC in our stroke analysis, and probability of admission to a non PCI-capable hospital
in our STEMI analysis. We expect to see a decline in the percent of stroke patients admitted
to non-PSCs and a decline in the percent of STEMI patients admitted to non PCI-capable
hospitals. Forty-four percent of stroke hospital events from treated zip codes are admitted
to non-PSCs in the pre-period compared to 18% admitted to non-PSCs from untreated zip
codes (Table 13). Only 7% of STEMI hospital events from treated zip codes are admitted
to non PCI-capable hospitals in the pre-period, compared to 1% of STEMI hospital events
from untreated zip codes (Table 14). Figure 11 shows unadjusted trends in admissions to
non-designated facilities over time by stroke type, STEMI and NSTEMI groups combined
for treated and untreated zip codes. While stroke patients of all types remain treated at
non-PSCs after regionalization, the percent of STEMI patients treated at non PCI-capable
hospitals drops to zero in the four quarters observed after STEMI regionalization. We also
examine the effects of regionalization on the probability of any hospital inpatient transfer,
under the hypothesis that transfers should decrease if more patients are directly transported
to regional centers, but could increase if non-regional centers cease all treatment for these
conditions.
We study a number of outcomes specific to stroke care. We examine the receipt of inpatient
thrombolytic therapy (ICD-9-CM procedure code 99.10). Tissue plasminogen activator
(tPA) is a type of thrombolytic therapy used in treatment of ischemic stroke to dissolve
the blood clot blocking blood flow to the brain. Non-invasive brain magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) and head computed tomography (CT) are used to distinguish ischemic
stroke from hemorrhage and should be performed prior to initiating thrombolytic therapy
for ischemic stroke (Latchaw et al., 2009; Morgenstern et al., 2010; Connolly et al., 2012;
Jauch et al., 2013). We define brain MRI using ICD-9-CM procedure code 88.91 and head
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Figure 11: Percent of Admissions to Non-Designated Facilities over Study Period
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TIA = transient ischemic attack; ICH = intracerebral hemorrhage; SAH = subarachnoid hem-
orrhage; AMI = acute myocardial infarction; STEMI = ST-elevation myocardial infarction;
NSTEMI = non-STEMI
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data
for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013
CT using ICD-9-CM procedure code 87.03. Minimally invasive imaging, such as cerebral
arteriography (digital subtraction angiography or DSA) which requires catheterization, may
be performed if the results of noninvasive imaging are inconclusive or contradictory (Jauch
et al., 2013; Danzinger, 2018). We measure rates of cerebral arteriography using ICD-9-CM
procedure code 88.41. Since we do not observe detailed timing of procedures in the PHC4
data, we examine changes in the probabilities of inpatient administration of tPA, head CT,
brain MRI, and cerebral angiography.
We test whether intensity of treatment changes as a result of regionalization by examining
surgical interventions for acute stroke, including intracranial vascular procedures and cran-
iotomy. We identify hospitalizations with any intracranial vascular intervention using Medi-
care Severity Diagnosis Related Groups (MS-DRGs) 020, 021, and 022; and the intracranial
vascular operating room procedures that comprise these MS-DRGs. Hospitalizations with
craniotomy are identified using MS-DRGs 023 through 027 and the craniotomy operating
room procedures that comprise these MS-DRGs. Intracranial hemorrhages may be treated
with surgical removal of the hemorrhage; subarachnoid hemorrhages may be treated with
surgical clipping, endovascular coiling, or complete obliteration of the aneurysm; and is-
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chemic stroke may be treated with mechanical thrombectomy (included in craniotomy)
(Morgenstern et al., 2010; Connolly et al., 2012; Jauch et al., 2013).
Specific to care for STEMI, we examine rates of percutaneous transluminal coronary angio-
plasty (PTCA) and coronary bypass (CABG). We identify PTCA using ICD-9-CM proce-
dure codes 00.66, 36.09, and 17.55. We identify CABG using ICD-9-CM procedure codes
36.1x. Primary percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) including PTCA is the Class I
level A guideline recommended treatment for STEMI patients; and CABG is recommended
for patients who are not amenable to PCI (Class I level B) (O’Gara et al., 2013).13
Next, we focus on short term outcomes, including hospital length of stay, in hospital mor-
tality, discharge status, and total charges. Hospital length of stay is defined as the sum of
reported days across all observed stays per hospital event. We expect hospital length of
stay to decrease if patients receive reperfusion therapy sooner in the case of ischemic stroke
and STEMI, or if patients receive monitoring and medical management to control pressure
in the case of hemorrhagic stroke.
Total charges represent the sum of charges for room and board, ancillary services, drugs,
medical equipment and supplies, specialty care units, and miscellaneous charges excluding
professional fees. These charges represent the amount billed by the hospital, not necessarily
the amount paid. If direct transportation to regional centers reduces between hospital
transfers for patients who are eligible for surgical intervention and/or reduces length of
stay, we would expect destination policies to lower charges. Charges could increase as a
result of regionalization if intensity of treatment increases. We test for this directly by
examining receipt of surgical interventions.
Finally, if regional systems of care optimize patient outcomes as intended, we would ex-
pect the probability of discharge to home to increase with regionalization. Our measure of
discharge to home includes routine discharges without care, discharges to home with home
13Here, “primary” refers to intervention without prior administration of fibrinolytic or antiplatlet therapy
(Keeley and Hillis, 2007).
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health care, discharges to home hospice, and discharges to court/law enforcement. Patients
who expire in the hospital are excluded from the regressions estimating the effect of re-
gionalization on discharge to home. For completeness, we also report rates of in hospital
mortality, though do not expect regionalization to have a noticeable effect.
Table 13: Unadjusted Outcomes of Interest by Geography (differential distance PSC >0),
Pre and Post Stroke Regionalization Policy
Treated Zip Untreated Zip
Outcomes of Interest Pre Post Pre Post
Non primary stroke center (%) 44.11 33.39 17.58 12.45
Any inpatient hospital transfer (%) 5.59 14.95 4.79 10.32
Imaging (%)
Head CT 6.87 7.69 9.68 3.70
Brain MRI 16.37 19.41 22.30 17.77
Cerebral angiography 20.13 10.66 22.36 9.96
Interventions (%)
Received tPA 2.97 4.02 3.14 3.84
Intracranial vascular procedures 2.23 2.53 2.52 2.40
Craniotomy 5.19 7.43 5.73 6.53
Discharged to home (%) 54.75 54.28 50.64 51.46
Length of stay 6.27 (7.63) 5.59 (12.13) 6.25 (8.26) 5.49 (7.53)
Total charges ($) 89,578 (173,772) 91,929 (181,779) 97,311 (158,426) 102,497 (144,049)
N 2,022 1,144 7,429 4,458
PSC = primary stroke center; tPA = tissue plasminogen activator; MRI = magnetic resonance imaging; CT
= computed tomography; STAC = short term acute care.
All outcomes, except for arrival at non primary stroke center and discharge status, are defined used the sum
of outcomes across all observed stays in the hospitalization. Arrival at non primary stroke center is defined
using the first observed stay for a hospitalization. Discharge status is defined using the last observed stay for
a hospitalization.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data for
Philadelphia (region 9), January 2008 through December 2013.
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Table 14: Unadjusted Outcomes of Interest by Geography (differential distance PCI >0),
Pre and Post STEMI Regionalization Policy
Treated Zip Untreated Zip
Outcomes of Interest Pre Post Pre Post
Non PCI capable hospital (%) 7.35 0.00 0.80 0.00
Any inpatient hospital transfer (%) 16.47 11.67 6.22 8.52
Interventions (%)
PTCA 79.12 86.67 80.14 80.72
Coronary bypass 2.65 6.67 5.52 7.17
Discharged to home 80.88 85.00 77.53 80.27
Length of stay 5.64 (5.97) 5.48 (4.82) 6.28 (8.16) 5.56 (9.08)
Total charges ($) 148,846 (127,573) 209,502 (186,806) 162,959 (217,231) 173,416 (289,555)
N 340 60 997 223
PCI = percutaneous coronary intervention; STEMI = ST-elevation myocardial infarction; PTCA = percutaneous
transluminal coronary angioplasty; STAC = short term acute care.
All outcomes, except for arrival at non PCI capable hospital and discharge status, are defined used the sum of
outcomes across all observed stays in the hospitalization. Arrival at non PCI capable hospital is defined using the
first observed stay for a hospitalization. Discharge status is defined using the last observed stay for a
hospitalization.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data for Philadelphia
(region 9), January 2008 through December 2013.
2.4. Empirical Strategy
We estimate the causal impact of regionalization by leveraging variation in Philadelphia
zip code exposure. Zip codes with non-zero differential distance to PSCs are more exposed
to stroke regionalization than zip codes where the differential distance to the nearest PSC
is zero. Zip codes with non-zero differential distance to PCI-capable hospitals are more
exposed to STEMI regionalization than zip codes where the differential distance is zero.
We study whether the probability of admission to non-designated facilities, probability of
inpatient hospital transfer, and average length of stay declined more in treated zip codes
relative to changes in untreated zip codes. We examine whether the probability of discharge
to home and the probability of receiving stroke-specific or STEMI-specific interventions
increased more in treated zip codes relative to changes in untreated zip codes. Finally, we
test the impact of regionalization on total charges, as charges could decrease with reductions
in length of stay or inpatient hospital transfers but increase with stroke-specific and STEMI-
specific interventions. We assume that absent regionalization, the change in outcomes for
treated zip codes would not have differed from the change in outcomes for untreated zip
codes.
64
First, we estimate the following event study specification, allowing the effect of zip code z
condition c treatment, dcz to vary over time, separately by condition.
ycizt = α
c
z + δt +
t=2013∑
t=2008
βt (d
c
z × 1 (yeart)) + ΓXizt + εizt (2.1)
yizt is the outcome of interest for hospital event i from zip code z in 12-month period t.
Twelve month periods run from October through September in our stroke analyses and
correspond to calendar years in our STEMI analyses. dcz indicates whether the zip code is
treated for condition c (stroke or STEMI) and is interacted with a full set of 12-month period
fixed effects. Xizt is a vector of admission-varying characteristics, including age, sex, race,
and insurance coverage included to improve precision. Comorbidities are not included as
they are defined using diagnoses reported on the inpatient admission, which may represent
complications correlated with treatment. We include zip code fixed effects αz to control for
time-invariant heterogeneity by zip code and 12-month period fixed effects δt to account
for unobserved heterogeneity over time. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity
and clustered at the zip code level. The coefficients of interest are the βt estimates, which
are presented relative to the 12-month period prior to treatment (October 2010 through
September 2011 for stroke and January 2012 through December 2012 for STEMI). We
examine pre-period coefficients for evidence of violation of our parallel trends assumption.
We also estimate the following difference-in-differences, separating our study period into a
pre and post period:
ycizt = α
c
z + δt + β (d
c
z × postct) + ΓXizt + εizt (2.2)
postct indicates the hospitalization occurs after condition c regionalization takes effect. β
represents our difference in differences estimate. In our main analysis, we estimate equations
2.1 and 2.2 using linear regression. We present estimates from a multinomial logit model for
nominal hospital discharge status in addition to the linear probability model for discharge
65
to home.
As shown in Figure 11, stroke patients remain treated at non-PSCs following regionalization.
In future work, we separate the effect of regionalization for patients who are admitted to
non-PSCs from those who are admitted to PSCs following Friebel et al. (2018):
ystrokeizt = α
stroke
z + δt + β1
(
dstrokez × nonPSCi
)
+ β2
(
poststroket × nonPSCi
)
+ β3
(
dstrokez × poststroket
)
+ β4
(
dstrokez × poststroket × nonPSCi
)
+ ΓXizt + εizt (2.3)
β3 captures the average differential change in outcomes for patients admitted to PSCs from
treated zip codes relative to the change for patients admitted to PSCs from untreated zip
codes, while β4 captures how different the differential change in outcomes is for patients
treated at non-PSCs. The total effect of regionalization on patients treated at non-PSCs is
the sum of β3 and β4. Our vector of admission level characteristics includes an indicator
for non-PSC admission.
2.5. Results
First, we provide evidence that regionalization is associated with a decrease in admissions
to non-designated hospitals as intended. We proceed to estimate the causal effect of re-
gionalization on the probability of receiving care specific to stroke and the probability of
receiving care specific to STEMI. Finally, we estimate the causal effect of regionalization
on our short term outcomes—probability of discharge to home, hospital length of stay, and
total charges.
2.5.1. Admission to Designated Hospitals
Figure 12 graphs the βt coefficients from our event-study specification presented in equation
2.1 for the probability of admission to a non-PSC in the stroke sample and for the probability
of admission to a non PCI-capable hospital for the STEMI sample. We include year and
zip code fixed effects, control for age, sex, race, and payer for each admission, and cluster
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standard errors at the zip code level. Both panels report 95% confidence intervals around
the βt coefficients. For both stroke and STEMI, we find no evidence of differences in
pre-intervention trends for treated and untreated zip codes. In the first year of stroke
regionalization, 2011, we find a non statistically significant increase in the probability of
admission to a non-PSC in zip codes exposed to stroke regionalization. Recall that this year
is partially treated, as regionalization did not begin until the third quarter of 2011. In the
first full year of stroke regionalization, 2012, we estimate a statistically significant decrease
in the probability of admission to a non-PSC in treated zip codes by 5.4 percentage points.
Our coefficient estimate for the 2013 suggests the decline in the probability of admission to a
non-PSC from treated zip codes persists, though this coefficient is not statistically significant
at the 5% level. In the first year of STEMI regionalization, we estimate a significant decrease
in the probability of admission to a non PCI-capable hospital for STEMI patients living in
treated zip codes by seven percentage points.
Figure 12: Relationship between Regionalization and Admission to Designated Hospitals,
Event-Study
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STEMI = ST elevation myocardial infarction.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data
for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013
In the first three columns of Table 15 we present the estimates from equation 2.2
for probability of admission to a non-PSC. The specification of the difference in differences
shown in column (1) includes an indicator for postt and an indicator for dz, instead of
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year and zip code fixed effects. The estimate implies that regionalization is associated
with a 5.6 percentage point decrease in the probability of admission to a non-PSC and
is statistically significant at the 5% level. In column (2) we add zip code fixed effects
to control for time-invariant heterogeneity in zip codes and calendar year fixed effects to
control for unobserved heterogeneity over time. In column (3) we add admission-level
covariates for age, sex, race, and payer. Though the magnitude of the effect remains around
5 percentage points, our estimate is no longer significant at the 5% level (it is significant
at 10%). In columns (4) through (7) we present the results of our preferred specification
including zip code and year fixed effects and admission-level covariates by stroke type.
Stroke regionalization is associated with a decrease in the probability of admission to a
non-PSC by 6.6 percentage points in the ischemic stroke subgroup. Regionalization has no
significant effect on the probability of admission to a non-PSC for patients with intracerebral
hemorrhage, subarachnoid hemorrhage, or TIA.
Table 15: Relationship between Stroke Regionalization and Admission to Non-PSC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dstrokez × poststroket -0.056∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.050∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.046 -0.059 -0.007
(0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.039) (0.052) (0.041)
Observations 15053 15053 15053 8999 1734 629 3691
Zip code FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Admission-level covariates No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Condition Stroke Stroke Stroke Ischemic ICH SAH TIA
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.
ICH = intracerebral hemorrhage; SAH = subarachnoid hemorrhage; TIA = transient ischemic attack.
Robust standard errors clustered at the patient zip code level are reported in parentheses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data for
Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013.
Table 16 presents our difference in differences estimates for the probability of ad-
mission to a non PCI-capable hospital in the STEMI group. Again, column (1) presents
difference in difference estimates without fixed effects or controls, but with postct and d
c
z
indicators. We find STEMI regionalization to be associated with a decrease in the prob-
ability of admission to a non PCI-capable hospital by 6.6 percentage points—an estimate
that is significant at the 1% level. Adding zip code and calendar year fixed effects reduces
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the magnitude of the estimate, only slightly, to 6.4 percentage points. Adding admission-
level covariates has no effect on the estimate. Interestingly, we find regionalization to be
associated with a marginally significant decline in the probability of admission to a non
PCI-capable hospital for NSTEMI patients from treated zip codes by 5.6 percentage points
[column (6)] (22% of baseline). This is surprising because ALS EMS providers can distin-
guish STEMI from NSTEMI in a pre-hospital setting using ECG.
These results, taken together, suggest that both stroke and STEMI regionalization in
Philadelphia has been successful in reducing the probability of admission to non-designated
facilities. In the case of STEMI, the reduction represents a complete elimination of STEMI
admissions to non PCI-capable facilities. In the case of stroke, in the last quarter of our
sample nearly 18% of stroke patients are admitted to non-PSCs. It remains to be answered
whether regionalization worsens care for stroke at non-PSCs. This is a potential direction
for future work.
Table 16: Relationship between STEMI Regionalization and Admission to Non
PCI-Capable Hospital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dSTEMIz × postSTEMIt -0.066∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.061∗ -0.057∗ -0.056∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.032) (0.030) (0.028)
Observations 1620 1620 1620 3734 3734 3734
Zip code FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Admission-level covariates No No Yes No No Yes
Condition STEMI STEMI STEMI NSTEMI NSTEMI NSTEMI
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.
STEMI = ST elevation myocardial infarction. NSTEMI = non-STEMI.
Robust standard errors clustered at the patient zip code level are reported in parentheses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data for
Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013.
2.5.2. Hospital Inpatient Transfer
Figure 13 presents the estimates of our event-study specification for probability of any
hospital inpatient transfer. Combined with the difference in difference estimates in Table
17, we find no convincing evidence that regionalization reduced the probability of any
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inpatient hospital transfer for stroke or STEMI. The stroke event study coefficients for
2012 and 2013, the first two full years of regionalization, are positive in direction, but
not statistically significant. The STEMI event study coefficient for 2013 (right panel of
Figure 13) and the difference in difference regression results in Table 17 are not statistically
significant, but are negative in direction.
Figure 13: Relationship between Regionalization and Hospital Inpatient Transfer,
Event-Study
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STEMI = ST elevation myocardial infarction.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data
for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013
Table 17: Relationship between Regionalization and Hospital Inpatient
Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dstrokez × poststroket 0.038∗ 0.036 0.034
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
dSTEMIz × postSTEMIt -0.071 -0.063 -0.064
(0.060) (0.059) (0.062)
Observations 15053 15053 15053 1620 1620 1620
Zip code FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Admission-level covariates No No Yes No No Yes
Condition Stroke Stroke Stroke STEMI STEMI STEMI
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.
STEMI = ST elevation myocardial infarction. Robust standard errors clustered at the
patient zip code level are reported in parentheses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient dis-
charge data for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013
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2.5.3. Stroke-Specific Imaging and Interventions
Here we report our event-study and regression results specific to stroke imaging and inter-
ventions.
Figure 14 shows estimated coefficients from our event-study for the probability of
head CT (left panel) and for the probability of brain MRI (right panel). Though the
coefficient estimates in the pre-period for probability of head CT are not statistically sig-
nificant from zero at the 5% level, taken together they suggest the existence of differences
in pre-intervention trends leading up to regionalization—a violation of the parallel trends
assumption required for identification of the causal estimate. As such, the difference in
difference results presented in Table 18 should not be taken as the causal estimates of re-
gionalization on the probabilities of receiving head CT for stroke diagnosis. Instead, the
event study figure on the left shows that the rate of head CT was increasing at a faster rate
in treated zip codes. Future work should account for these differences in pre-intervention
trends.
The right panel of Figure 14 shows a statistically significant increase in the probability
of inpatient brain MRI starting with the first full year of regionalization, 2013, and contin-
uing into the second full year of regionalization. Table 19 quantifies this effect in the post
period as an increase in the probability of inpatient brain MRI by 7.1 percentage points
[column (3)]. As shown in column (4), the effect comes from the statistically significant
increase in the ischemic stroke subtype.
Figure 15 presents the estimated coefficients from our event-study for the probability
of receiving in hospital tPA (left panel) and the probability of cerebral arteriography (right
panel). We find no evidence that regionalization is associated with increased probability of
receipt of tPA in the inpatient setting or with increased probability of cerebral arteriography.
Table 20 similarly reports no significant results from the difference in differences estimate for
probability of inpatient receipt of tPA for all types of acute stroke combined and by stroke
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subtype. Table 21 reports the difference in differences results for probability of cerebral
arteriography.
Figure 16 presents the coefficient estimates of the event-studies for probability of any
intracranial vascular procedure and probability of craniotomy. Both panels suggest that
stroke regionalization has no effect on probability of undergoing surgical intervention for
stroke. Tables 22 and 23 present the difference in differences estimates for probability of
any intracranial vascular procedure and probability of craniotomy, respectively. Just as
the event-study reports no effect, the difference in differences estimation finds no effect of
regionalization on receipt of stroke-specific surgical interventions for stroke overall or for
stroke subsample.
These stroke-specific results suggest that stroke regionalization is associated with
limited changes in diagnostic imaging, inpatient receipt of thrombolytic therapy, or surgical
interventions for stroke.
Figure 14: Relationship between Stroke Regionalization and Imaging, Event-Study
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MRI = magnetic resonance imaging; CT = computed tomography.
Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data for
Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013
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Table 18: Relationship between Stroke Regionalization and Head CT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dstrokez × poststroket 0.068∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗ -0.066 0.058∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.032) (0.070) (0.032)
Observations 15053 15053 15053 8999 1734 629 3691
Zip code FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Admission-level covariates No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Condition Stroke Stroke Stroke Ischemic ICH SAH TIA
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.
CT = computed tomography; ICH = intracerebral hemorrhage; SAH = subarachnoid hemorrhage;
TIA = transient ischemic attack.
Robust standard errors clustered at the patient zip code level are reported in parentheses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data for
Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013.
Table 19: Relationship between Stroke Regionalization and Brain MRI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dstrokez × poststroket 0.076∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.026 -0.019 0.045
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.044) (0.048) (0.030)
Observations 15053 15053 15053 8999 1734 629 3691
Zip code FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Admission-level covariates No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Condition Stroke Stroke Stroke Ischemic ICH SAH TIA
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.
MRI = magnetic resonance imaging; ICH = intracerebral hemorrhage; SAH = subarachnoid hemor-
rhage; TIA = transient ischemic attack.
Robust standard errors clustered at the patient zip code level are reported in parentheses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data for
Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013.
Table 20: Relationship between Stroke Regionalization and tPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dstrokez × poststroket 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.005 -0.010 -0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.011) (0.001)
Observations 15053 15053 15053 8999 1734 629 3691
Zip code FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Admission-level covariates No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Condition Stroke Stroke Stroke Ischemic ICH SAH TIA
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.
tPA = tissue plasminogen activator; ICH = intracerebral hemorrhage; SAH = subarachnoid hem-
orrhage; TIA = transient ischemic attack.
Robust standard errors clustered at the patient zip code level are reported in parentheses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data
for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013.
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Figure 15: Relationship between Stroke Regionalization and tPA Administration, Cerebral
Arteriography, Event-Study
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tPA = tissue plasminogen activator.
Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data for
Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013
Table 21: Relationship between Stroke Regionalization and Cerebral Arteriography
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dstrokez × poststroket 0.029 0.026 0.022 0.034 -0.024 -0.074 0.027
(0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.032) (0.034) (0.132) (0.022)
Observations 15053 15053 15053 8999 1734 629 3691
Zip code FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Admission-level covariates No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Condition Stroke Stroke Stroke Ischemic ICH SAH TIA
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.
tPA = tissue plasminogen activator; ICH = intracerebral hemorrhage; SAH = subarachnoid hem-
orrhage; TIA = transient ischemic attack.
Robust standard errors clustered at the patient zip code level are reported in parentheses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data
for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013.
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Figure 16: Relationship between Stroke Regionalization and Surgical Interventions,
Event-Study
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Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data for
Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013
Table 22: Relationship between Stroke Regionalization and Intracranial Vascular
Procedure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dstrokez × poststroket 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.113 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.010) (0.083) (0.002)
Observations 15053 15053 15053 8999 1734 629 3691
Zip code FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Admission-level covariates No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Condition Stroke Stroke Stroke Ischemic ICH SAH TIA
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.
ICH = intracerebral hemorrhage; SAH = subarachnoid hemorrhage; TIA = transient ischemic
attack.
Robust standard errors clustered at the patient zip code level are reported in parentheses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data
for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013.
75
Table 23: Relationship between Stroke Regionalization and Craniotomy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dstrokez × poststroket 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.022 0.054 -0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.069) (0.080) (0.002)
Observations 15053 15053 15053 8999 1734 629 3691
Zip code FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Admission-level covariates No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Condition Stroke Stroke Stroke Ischemic ICH SAH TIA
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.
ICH = intracerebral hemorrhage; SAH = subarachnoid hemorrhage; TIA = transient ischemic
attack.
Robust standard errors clustered at the patient zip code level are reported in parentheses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data
for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013.
2.5.4. STEMI-Specific Interventions
In this section, we explore the causal effects of STEMI regionalization on the probability
of undergoing PTCA and the probability of undergoing coronary bypass. The left panel
of Figure 17 reports the coefficients from estimating our event-study specification for the
probability of PTCA. The 2008 through 2011 estimated coefficients are below zero (2012
estimate is normalized to zero), but not significantly different from zero at the 5% level,
suggesting that treated zip codes experienced larger increase in probability of PTCA in the
year Philadelphia enrolled in the Mission: Lifeline demonstration (2012) and in 2013 than
did untreated zip codes, at the 10% level. This is confirmed in our difference in differences
regression estimates presented in Table 24. Column (3) shows our preferred specification
that includes zip code and year fixed effects and admission-level covariates for age, sex,
race, and payer. We find that STEMI regionalization is associated with an increase in the
probability of PTCA by 6.9 percentage points. We find no effect on the probability of
PTCA for NSTEMI patients [columns (4) through (6) of Table 17] who are not covered by
regionalization.
The right panel of Figure 17 shows the coefficients from the event study estimated
for probaility of coronary bypass. The differential change in probability of coronary bypass
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for STEMI patients from treated zip codes is not statistically different from the change
for STEMI patients from untreated zip codes in any year of our study, before or after
regionalization. Table 25 reports the corresponding difference in difference estimates for
the probability of coronary bypass, again showing that regionalization did not affect rates
of bypass for STEMI patients (or NSTEMI patients).
Figure 17: Relationship between STEMI Regionalization and Coronary Intervention,
Event-Study
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PTCA = percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty.
Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data for
Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013
Table 24: Relationship between STEMI Regionalization and PTCA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dSTEMIz × postSTEMIt 0.070 0.069 0.069∗ -0.016 -0.016 -0.019
(0.051) (0.047) (0.041) (0.053) (0.054) (0.045)
Observations 1620 1620 1620 3734 3734 3734
Zip code FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Admission-level covariates No No Yes No No Yes
Condition STEMI STEMI STEMI NSTEMI NSTEMI NSTEMI
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.
PTCA = percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty; STEMI = ST elevation myocardial
infarction; NSTEMI = non-STEMI.
Robust standard errors clustered at the patient zip code level are reported in parentheses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge
data for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013.
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Table 25: Relationship between STEMI Regionalization and Coronary Bypass
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dSTEMIz × postSTEMIt 0.024 0.024 0.021 -0.029 -0.032 -0.031
(0.042) (0.041) (0.040) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020)
Observations 1620 1620 1620 3734 3734 3734
Zip code FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Admission-level covariates No No Yes No No Yes
Condition STEMI STEMI STEMI NSTEMI NSTEMI NSTEMI
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.
STEMI = ST elevation myocardial infarction; NSTEMI = non-STEMI.
Robust standard errors clustered at the patient zip code level are reported in parentheses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge
data for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013.
2.5.5. Discharge Status
The next few sections examine the effect of regionalization on short term outcomes, com-
mon to stroke and STEMI. Specifically we look at the probability of in-hospital mortality,
probability of discharge to home, average length of stay, and total charges.
Figure 18: Relationship between Regionalization and in-Hospital Mortality, Event-Study
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STEMI = ST elevation myocardial infarction.
Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data for
Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013
Figure 18 plots the coefficients from the event-study estimation for the probability
of in-hospital mortality for stroke (left) and STEMI (right), while Table 26 presents the
results of the difference in differences estimates. We find no evidence that implementation
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Table 26: Relationship between Regionalization and in-Hospital Mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dstrokez × poststroket 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
dSTEMIz × postSTEMIt -0.020 -0.030 -0.028
(0.045) (0.040) (0.037)
Observations 15053 15053 15053 1620 1620 1620
Zip code FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Admission-level covariates No No Yes No No Yes
Condition Stroke Stroke Stroke STEMI STEMI STEMI
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.
STEMI = ST elevation myocardial infarction. Robust standard errors clustered at the
patient zip code level are reported in parentheses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient dis-
charge data for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013
of either regional systems of care impacted in-hospital mortality.
Figure 19 plots the coefficients of our event-study estimation for the probability of
discharge to home for patient surviving the hospitalization. For both stroke (left panel)
and STEMI (right panel), regionalization had no effect on the probability of discharge to
home. Table 27 reports the difference in differences estimates which similarly find no effect
of regionalization on the probability of discharge to home for stroke and STEMI. Table
28 shows the results of an alternative set of specifications used to estimate the effect of
regionalization on discharge status for stroke. Here we estimate a multinomial logit model
using discharge to home as the baseline category. Again, we find no evidence that stroke
regionalization affected discharge status.
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Figure 19: Relationship between Regionalization and Discharge to Home, Event-Study
 Stroke regionalization
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
Es
tim
at
ed
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
12 month period, starting quarter 4
(a) Stroke
 STEMI
 regionalization
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Es
tim
at
ed
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
calendar year
(b) STEMI
STEMI = ST elevation myocardial infarction.
Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data for
Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013
Table 27: Relationship between Regionalization and Discharge to Home
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dstrokez × poststroket -0.012 -0.012 -0.021
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
dSTEMIz × postSTEMIt -0.005 0.002 0.001
(0.052) (0.057) (0.052)
Observations 14228 14228 14228 1483 1483 1483
Zip code FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Admission-level covariates No No Yes No No Yes
Condition Stroke Stroke Stroke STEMI STEMI STEMI
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.
STEMI = ST elevation myocardial infarction. Robust standard errors clustered at the
patient zip code level are reported in parentheses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient dis-
charge data for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013
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Table 28: Relationship between Regionalization and
Discharge Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skillednursing
dzstroke × posttstroke 0.099 0.088 0.143
(0.105) (0.098) (0.121)
dzSTEMI × posttSTEMI 0.134
(0.410)
Inpatientrehab
dzstroke × posttstroke 0.016 0.015 0.031
(0.112) (0.115) (0.110)
dzSTEMI × posttSTEMI -0.628
(0.748)
Expired
dzstroke × posttstroke 0.052 0.031 0.079
(0.200) (0.201) (0.207)
dzSTEMI × posttSTEMI -0.453
(0.853)
Observations 15053 15053 15053 1620
Zip code FE No Yes Yes No
Year FE No Yes Yes No
Admission-level covariates No No Yes No
Condition Stroke Stroke Stroke STEMI
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.
STEMI = ST elevation myocardial infarction.
Robust standard errors clustered at the patient zip code level are
reported in parentheses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council
(PHC4) inpatient discharge data for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008
to 2013.
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2.5.6. Length of Stay
Figure 20 presents the estimates of our event-study specification for length of stay. Though
the stroke coefficient estimates in the pre-period are not statistically significant from zero
at the 5% level, taken together they suggest the existence of differences in pre-intervention
trends leading up to regionalization—length of stay for stroke patients from treated zip
codes was decreasing at a faster rate than length of stay for stroke patients from untreated
zip codes. The difference in difference results presented in Table 29 that suggest stroke
regionalization is associated with a decrease in length of stay should not be taken as causal
estimates of the policy, as they likely reflect an continuation of the pre-intervention trends.
Future work should adjust equation 2.2 to allow for treatment group specific pre-intervention
trends.
The right panel of Figure 20 plots the estimated event-study coefficients for length
of stay for STEMI hospitalizations, suggests that regionalization has no effect on length
of stay of STEMI. This null effect is also shown in our difference in differences estimates
reported in Table 29.
Figure 20: Relationship between Regionalization and Length of Stay, Event-Study
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Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013
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Table 29: Relationship between Regionalization and Length of Stay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dstrokez × poststroket -0.262 -0.350∗ -0.355∗
(0.187) (0.195) (0.196)
dSTEMIz × postSTEMIt 0.865 0.840 0.790
(0.624) (0.684) (0.647)
Observations 15053 15053 15053 1620 1620 1620
Zip code FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Admission-level covariates No No Yes No No Yes
Condition Stroke Stroke Stroke STEMI STEMI STEMI
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.
STEMI = ST elevation myocardial infarction. Robust standard errors clustered at the
patient zip code level are reported in parentheses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient dis-
charge data for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013
2.5.7. Charges
Our examination of the effect of regionalization on total charges finds no evidence that
the system change affected charges for stroke hospital events, as shown by the coefficients
plotted in the left panel of Figure 21 and the first three columns of Table 30. The right
panel of Figure 21 reports a significant positive effect of STEMI regionalization on total
charges. STEMI regionalization increased total charges in 2013 relative to 2012. Columns
(4) through (6) of Table 30 report the difference in difference estimates for logged-total
charges in STEMI. Our preferred specification includes zip code and year fixed effects and
admission-level coviariates age, sex, race, and payer, the results of which are presented in
column (6). STEMI regionalization increased total charges by 29.6% (100×exp(0.259)−1))
in the first year (2013). This result makes sense if regionalization moves patients from low
charge to higher charge hospitals, even if utilization of acute care services remains the same.
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Figure 21: Relationship between Regionalization and ln(Total Charges), Event-Study
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Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data for
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Table 30: Relationship between Regionalization and ln(Total Charges)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dstrokez × poststroket 0.007 0.003 -0.005
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
dSTEMIz × postSTEMIt 0.260∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.089) (0.090)
Observations 15053 15053 15053 1620 1620 1620
Zip code FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Admission-level covariates No No Yes No No Yes
Condition Stroke Stroke Stroke STEMI STEMI STEMI
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10.
STEMI = ST elevation myocardial infarction. Robust standard errors clustered at the
patient zip code level are reported in parentheses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge
data for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 to 2013
2.6. Conclusion and Future Work
Our results to date suggest that Philadelphia’s acute stroke and STEMI regional systems
of care are associated with improved matching of patients to facilities best equipped to
treat stroke/STEMI. Specifically, we find that regionalization decreases the probability of
admission to a non-PCI capable hospital by 6.4 percentage points, representing anear com-
plete elimination of STEMI admissions to non PCI-capable facilities. In the case of stroke,
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while we find that regionalization decreases the probability of admission to a non-PSC by
5.0 percentage points, in the last quarter of our sample nearly 18% of stroke patients are
admitted to non-PSCs. Future work will look specifically at the effect of regionalization for
stroke patients who remain treated at non-PSCs.
We find evidence that the probability of receiving inpatient head CT was increasing
faster in treated zip codes than in untreated zip codes prior to regionalization; and that
length of stay in was decreasing faster for stroke hospital events from treated zip codes than
for events from untreated zip codes prior to regionalization. Future work should address
this by adjusting equation 2.2 to allow for differences in pre-intervention trends. We find a
statistically significant increase in the probability of inpatient brain MRI. Our stroke-specific
results suggest that stroke regionalization is not associated with any change in inpatient
receipt of thrombolytic therapy, or surgical interventions for stroke. We find no evidence
that stroke regionalization affected hospital discharge status. Though we find no effect
of STEMI regionalization on hospital length of stay or discharge status, we estimate that
STEMI regionalization is associated with a marginally significant increase in the probability
of PTCA and an economically and statistically significant increase in total charges by 29.6%.
Taken together, these results suggest that while regionalization may reduce time to receipt
of services (something we cannot measure with our data), it has little effect of the eventual
receipt of services.
What do our results imply for the future of regional systems of care? First, region-
alization is effective in channeling volume to designated facilities. Second, the effects of
regionalization may be condition and market specific. Even when considering two similar
time-critical illnesses in a single market, we found only one system to have short term ef-
fects beyond the initial impact on admissions volume. While this paper does not investigate
reasons why the STEMI regional system was more effective than the stroke regional system,
we have a number of ideas. First, hospitals face significantly higher barriers to entering the
STEMI regional system of care. In order to receive STEMI patients, hospitals must not
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only have a catheterization lab, they must be capable of performing bypass surgery or have
an exception from the state of Pennsylvania. In contrast, the barriers to entering the stroke
regional system of care are relatively low as shown by the four hospitals that enter the
stroke care system after regionalization (Table 10). Second, stroke is difficult to diagnose in
the pre-hospital setting, as definitive diagnosis requires imaging. In contrast, STEMI can
be diagnosed in the pre hospital setting with ECG, common to both physician offices and
ALS EMS providers.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Hospital revenue target deviation from mean historic revenue
I compare mean historic hospital revenue to target hospital revenue for hospitals partic-
ipating in the GBR. Hospital gross patient revenue is sourced from the Health Service
Cost Review Commission (HSCRC) annual hospital disclosure reports, fiscal years 2008 to
2013.1 Hospital base period approved revenue under the GBR is outlined in each hospital’s
GBR agreement with the HSCRC. All agreements were signed after December 2013. Aca-
demic Medical Centers Johns Hopkins Hospital, Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center,
Suburban Hospital (Johns Hopkins), and University of Maryland Medical Center initially
agreed to a payment system change that excluded revenue from out-of-state patients. The
University of Maryland Medical Center included out-of-state patient revenue starting fiscal
year 2015; Johns Hopkins facilities included out-of-state patient revenue starting fiscal year
2017. I add the HSCRC’s estimate of out-of-state revenue to approved GBR revenue to
calculate targeth for these facilities, as historic revenues do not separately identify revenue
from nonresidents.2
While targeth is taken directly from GBR agreements, mean historic gross patient revenue
is calculated as follows using gross patient revenue from annual hospital disclosure reports:
revh =
∑2012
t=2008 revht
nh
I plot the natural log of target revenue against the natural log of mean historic revenue in
Figure 22. There is little to no variation in deviation of target revenue from mean historic
revenue, as shown by distance from the 45-degree line in Figure 22, to exploit.
1The majority of hospitals have fiscal years ending June 30th. Bon Secours Hospital uses a fiscal year
ending August 31. Fort Washington Medical Center, Shady Grove Adventist Hospital, UM Harford Memorial
Hospital, UM Upper Chesapeake, and Washington Adventists Hospital have fiscal years ending December
31.
2These AMCs, and specifically Johns Hopkins, argued that its tertiary care was designed to attract
nonresidents; therefore, limiting revenues for these patients would make offering these services less attractive
(Haber et al., 2016).
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Figure 22: Maryland Hospital Target Revenue vs. Mean Historic Revenue
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Source: Health Service Cost Review Commission (HSCRC) annual hospital dis-
closure reports, fiscal years 2008 to 2013, and HSCRC Global Budget Revenue
agreements.
A.2. NSTEMI characteristics
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Table 31: Admission Characteristics by Geography (differential distance PCI >0), Pre
STEMI Regionalization Policy, January 2008 - December 2012
Treated Zip Untreated Zip
Admission Characteristics
Age, in years 66.75 (14.02) 67.80 (14.42)
Sex (%)
Female 46.80 47.31
Male 53.20 52.69
Race (%)
White 31.03 47.95
Black 58.50 34.55
Asian 1.35 1.57
Other race 9.11 15.94
Hispanic/Latino origin/descent (%) 1.85 8.71
Payer (%)
Uninsured 2.46 1.29
Medicare 56.40 60.85
Medicaid 18.23 18.33
Blue Cross 13.18 11.79
Commercial 5.91 6.22
Government 2.96 1.43
Comorbidities (%)
Myocardial infarction 100.00 100.00
Congestive heart failure 38.05 40.30
Peripheral vascular disease 5.30 7.37
Cerebrovascular disease 5.30 5.76
Dementia 2.09 1.34
Chronic pulmonary disease 21.18 21.05
Rheumatic disease 1.23 1.20
Peptic ulcer disease 0.49 0.60
Mild liver disease 2.09 2.03
Diabetes without complications 31.53 30.77
Diabetes with complications 3.45 4.01
Hemiplegia or paraplegia 0.25 0.64
Renal disease 18.23 20.77
Malignancy, except skin 3.20 3.27
Moderate or severe liver disease 0.37 0.37
Metastatic solid tumor 0.74 0.92
AIDS/HIV 0.25 0.46
Exposure (%)
Zip exposure group d.distance PCI 100.00 0.00
Differential distance PCI, in miles 1.53 (1.21) 0.00 (0.00)
N 812 2,171
PCI = percutaneous coronary intervention; STEMI = ST-elevation myocardial
infarction.
All characteristics, except for comborbidities, are defined using the first observed
stay for a hospitalization, unless the characeristic is missing. Comorbidities are
defined using the primary diagnoses from each observed stay of the
hospitalization and secondary diagnoses in order of observed stay, up to nine
diagnoses.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient
discharge data for Philadelphia (region 9), 2008 through December 2012.
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Table 32: Unadjusted Outcomes of Interest by Geography (differential distance PCI >0),
Pre and Post STEMI Regionalization Policy
Treated Zip Untreated Zip
Outcomes of Interest Pre Post Pre Post
Non PCI capable hospital (%) 25.25 17.39 2.44 0.65
Any inpatient hospital transfer (%) 17.98 26.09 9.44 7.01
Interventions (%)
PTCA 38.55 37.68 37.77 38.50
Coronary bypass 7.88 7.25 8.15 10.44
Discharged to home 70.32 73.91 72.18 75.86
Length of stay 6.64 (18.81) 6.38 (8.48) 6.62 (7.26) 5.82 (7.34)
Total charges ($) 135,397 (169,274) 162,391 (311,393) 132,342 (178,329) 153,015 (222,631)
N 812 138 2,171 613
PCI = percutaneous coronary intervention; STEMI = ST-elevation myocardial infarction; PTCA = percutaneous
transluminal coronary angioplasty; STAC = short term acute care.
All outcomes, except for arrival at non PCI capable hospital and discharge status, are defined used the sum of
outcomes across all observed stays in the hospitalization. Arrival at non PCI capable hospital is defined using the
first observed stay for a hospitalization. Discharge status is defined using the last observed stay for a hospitalization.
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) inpatient discharge data for Philadelphia
(region 9), January 2008 through December 2013.
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